Since 2011 the European Commission has assessed every 3 years a list of Critical Raw Materials (CRMs) for the EU economy within its Raw Materials Initiative. To date, 14 CRMs were identified in 2011, 20 in 2014, 27 in 2017 and 30 in 2020.[1] These materials are mainly used in energy transition and digital technologies.[1] Then in March 2023 Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed the Critical Raw Materials Act,[2] "for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the European Council establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials".[3] At the time, Europe depended on China for 98% of its rare-earth needs, 97% of its lithium supply and 93% of its magnesium supply.[4]

In the U.S., critical minerals that are at risk of shortage or supply chain disruption are assessed by the United States Geological Survey and by the National Science and Technology Council.[5][6][7][8]

Definition

Critical materials have been defined by one academic group as "raw materials for which there are no viable substitutes with current technologies, which most consumer countries are dependent on importing, and whose supply is dominated by one or a few producers".[9]

Several factors may combine to make a raw material (mineral or not) a critical resource. These may include the following:

  • A ceiling on production: when the raw material reaches its Hubbert peak
  • A drop in proven reserves
  • A decline in the ratio of production from the biggest deposits to production from smaller deposits, since the largest deposits supply most of a raw material's production
  • Inefficient price system: when the increase in the price of a raw material does not result in a proportional increase in its production
  • Costs of extraction (money or effort) increase over time, as extraction becomes more difficult.

European strategy pre-2023

According to the United Nations in 2011,[10] as the demand for rare metals will quickly exceed the consumed tonnage in 2013,[11] it is urgent and priority should be placed on recycling rare metals with a worldwide production lower than 100 000 t/year, in order to conserve natural resources and energy.[11] However, this measure will not be enough. Planned obsolescence of products which contain these metals should be limited, and all elements inside computers, mobile phones or other electronic objects found in electronic waste should be recycled. This involves looking for eco-designed alternatives, and changes in consumer behavior in favor of selective sorting aimed at an almost total recycling of these metals.

Europe alone produced about 12 million tons of metallic wastes in 2012, and this amount tended to grow more than 4% a year (faster than municipal waste). However, fewer than 20 metals, of the 60 studied by experts of the UNEP, were recycled to more than 50% in the world. 34 compounds were recycled at lower than 1% of the total discarded as trash.

According to the UNEP, even without new technologies, that rate could be greatly increased. The energy efficiency of the production and recycling methods has also to be developed.[11]

Information about the location of deposits of rare metals is scarce. In 2013, the US DOE created the Critical Materials Institute, whose intended role is to focus on finding and commercializing ways to reduce reliance on the critical materials essential for American competitiveness in the clean energy technologies.[12]

On 3 September 2020, the European Commission presented its strategy to both strengthen and better control its supply of some thirty materials deemed critical, in particular rare earths. The list includes, for example:

  • graphite, lithium and cobalt, used in the manufacture of electric batteries;
  • silicon, an essential component of solar panels;
  • rare earths used for magnets,
  • conductive seeds and electronic components.

Where European resources are insufficient, the Commission promises to strengthen long-term partnerships, notably with Canada, Africa and Australia.[13][14][15][16][17]

Issues

There are many issues about these resources and they concern a large number of people and human activities. It is possible to distinguish:

  • Economic: the price of metals increases when their scarcity or inaccessibility increases, and not only according to demand for them. As part of transition management, the circular economy invites citizens to recycle these resources as well as to save them and/or to replace them with alternatives when it is possible; that could be greatly facilitated with the generalization of ecotax and eco-design.[18]
  • Geostrategic: These rare products are necessary for computer and other communications equipment and can themselves be the subject of armed conflict or simply provide armed conflict with a source of funding. Both coltan and blood diamonds have been examples of the resource curse that plagues some parts of Africa.
  • Social: Increasing globalization and mobility of people, means that telecoms and social networks depend more and more on the availability of these resources.
  • Health: Several critical metals or minerals are toxic or reprotoxic. Paradoxically, some cytotoxins are used in cancer therapy (and then also improperly discarded although really dangerous for the environment; the average cost of the treatment of a lung cancer varies between 20,000 and 27,000 euros[19][20][21]). Thus, toxic and cancer-causing platinum is also widely used in cancer chemotherapy in the form of carboplatin and cisplatin, both cytotoxins combined with other molecules, including for example gemcitabine (GEM), vinorelbine (VIN), docetaxel (DOC), and paclitaxel (PAC).
  • Energy: Production of these metals and their compounds requires a significant and increasing amount of energy, and when they become rarer, it is necessary to search deeper for them, and the further mineral recovered is sometimes less condensed than previous production had been. In 2012, from 7 to 8% of all the energy used in the world was used to extract these minerals.[11]
  • Environmental: The mines degrade the environment. The dispersion of minerals and toxic non-recycled metals degrades it too. Furthermore, the magnets in electrical motors, or wind and water turbines, as well as some components of solar panels also need many of these same minerals or rare metals.[22][23]

The Act

The Call for evidence preliminary to the Act was made in autumn 2022.[24] The Act "identifies a list of strategic raw materials, which are crucial to technologies important to Europe's green and digital ambitions and for defence and space applications, while being subject to potential supply risks in the future." By 2030, one single ex-EU country shall produce not more than 65% of the EU's annual consumption of each strategic raw material. Clear benchmarks have been set for domestic capacities of the EU, which will by 2030:[2]

  • extract at least 10% of the EU's annual consumption;
  • process at least 40% of the EU's annual consumption;
  • recycle at least 15% of the EU's annual consumption.

The Act will "reduce the administrative burden and simplify permitting procedures for critical raw materials projects in the EU. In addition, selected Strategic Projects will benefit from support for access to finance and shorter permitting timeframes (24 months for extraction permits and 12 months for processing and recycling permits). Member States will also have to develop national programmes for exploring geological resources."[2]

The document acknowledges that the EU "will never be self-sufficient in supplying such raw materials and will continue to rely on imports for a majority of its consumption. International trade is therefore essential to supporting global production and ensuring diversification of supply. The EU will need to strengthen its global engagement with reliable partners to develop and diversify investment and promote stability in international trade and strengthen legal certainty for investors. In particular, the EU will seek mutually beneficial partnerships with emerging markets and developing economies, notably in the framework of its Global Gateway strategy."[2]

European lists of critical raw materials

Figure gives a summary of critical raw materials lists reported by the European Commission in 2011, 2014 and 2017

All critical raw materials are graphically summarised on the periodic table of elements published in review paper "The Critical Raw Materials in Cutting Tools for Machining Applications: A Review".[25] The list was updated in March 2023.[26]

They are also shown in the table below.[1]

2011 2014 2017 2020 2023
. . . . Aluminium
Antimony Antimony Antimony Antimony Antimony
. . . . Arsenic
. . . Bauxite Bauxite
. . Baryte Baryte Baryte
Beryllium Beryllium Beryllium Beryllium Beryllium
. . Bismuth Bismuth Bismuth
. Borate Borate Borate Borate
. . . . Boron
. Chromium . . .
Cobalt Cobalt Cobalt Cobalt Cobalt
. . . . Copper
. Coking coal Coking coal Coking coal Coking coal
. . . . Feldspar
Fluorspar Fluorspar Fluorspar Fluorspar Fluorspar
Gallium Gallium Gallium Gallium Gallium
Germanium Germanium Germanium Germanium Germanium
Graphite Graphite Graphite Graphite Graphite
. . Hafnium Hafnium Hafnium
. . Helium . Helium
Indium Indium Indium Indium Indium
. . . Lithium Lithium
. Magnesite . . .
Magnesium Magnesium Magnesium Magnesium Magnesium
. . . . Manganese
. . Natural rubber Natural rubber .
. . . . Nickel
Niobium Niobium Niobium Niobium Niobium
Platinum group metals Platinum group metals Platinum group metals Platinum group metals Platinum group metals
. Phosphate rock Phosphate rock Phosphate rock Phosphate rock
. . Phosphorus Phosphorus Phosphorus
Scandium . Scandium Scandium Scandium
. Silicon Silicon Silicon Silicon
. . . Strontium Strontium
Tantalum . Tantalum Tantalum Tantalum
. . . Titanium Titanium
Rare earth Light rare earth Light rare earth Light rare earth Light rare earth
Heavy rare earth Heavy rare earth Heavy rare earth Heavy rare earth
Tungsten Tungsten Tungsten Tungsten Tungsten
. . Vanadium Vanadium Vanadium

See also

References

  1. 1 2 3 "COM(2020) 474 final. Critical Raw Materials Resilience: Charting a Path towards greater Security and Sustainability". European Commission. Brussels. 3 September 2020.
  2. 1 2 3 4 "Critical Raw Materials: ensuring secure and sustainable supply chains for EU's green and digital future". European Commission. 16 March 2023.
  3. ↑ "PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION European Critical Raw Materials Act". European Commission. 16 March 2023.
  4. ↑ "Speech by President von der Leyen on EU-China relations to the Mercator Institute for China Studies and the European Policy Centre". European Commission. 30 March 2023.
  5. ↑ Nassar, Nedal T.; Brainard, Jamie; Gulley, Andrew (2020). "Evaluating the mineral commodity supply risk of the U.S. manufacturing sector". Science Advances. 6 (8): eaay8647. Bibcode:2020SciA....6.8647N. doi:10.1126/sciadv.aay8647. ISSN 2375-2548. PMC 7035000. PMID 32128413.
  6. ↑ Nassar, Nedal T.; Fortier, Steven M. (2021), "Methodology and technical input for the 2021 review and revision of the U.S. Critical Minerals List", Open-File Report, US Geological Survey, doi:10.3133/ofr20211045, ISSN 2331-1258, S2CID 235867435
  7. ↑ "National Minerals Information Center - U.S. Geological Survey". 2021-12-09. Retrieved 2022-01-30.
  8. ↑ U.S. National Science and Technology Council,Subcommittee on Critical and Strategic Mineral Supply Chains (2016). "Assessment of Critical Minerals: Screening Methodology and Initial Application" (PDF). Retrieved 30 January 2022.
  9. ↑ Overland, Indra (2019-03-01). "The geopolitics of renewable energy: Debunking four emerging myths". Energy Research & Social Science. 49: 36–40. doi:10.1016/j.erss.2018.10.018. ISSN 2214-6296.
  10. ↑ Rapport PNUE de mai 2011
  11. 1 2 3 4 Rapport du Panel international des ressources du Programme des Nations unies pour l'environnement (Pnue) du 24 avril 2013
  12. ↑ Turner, Roger (21 June 2019). "A Strategic Approach to Rare-Earth Elements as Global Trade Tensions Flare". www.greentechmedia.com.
  13. ↑ "Commission announces actions to make Europe's raw materials supply more secure and sustainable" (Press release). Brussels: European Commission. September 2020. Retrieved 2022-02-16.
  14. ↑ Transition énergétique : le plan de Bruxelles pour accéder aux matières premières, Les Échos, 3 septembre 2020.
  15. ↑ "COM(2020) 474 final. Critical Raw Materials Resilience: Charting a Path towards greater Security and Sustainability". European Commission. Brussels. 3 September 2020.
  16. ↑ Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (2020). Critical Raw Materials for Strategic Technologies and Sectors in the EU - A Foresight Study. European Commission. doi:10.2873/58081. ISBN 9789276153368. Retrieved 2022-02-16.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  17. ↑ "List of Critical Raw Materials 2020 - including four new ones". ESM Foundation. 2020-09-07. Retrieved 2022-02-16.
  18. ↑ The French Economic, Social and Environmental Council ((CESE)) is backing éco-conception and recycling to economize mineral resources Steering the French economy towards economical use of raw materials in the inductrial sector is a priority that should be written into the framework for national strategy got ecological transition, according to CESE, which has proposed a series of measures towards this end], actu-environnement 2014-01-14
  19. ↑ Comella P, Frasci, Panza N, Manzione L, De Cataldis G, Cioffi R, Maiorino L, Micillo E, Lorusso V, Di Rienzo G, Filippelli G, Lamberti A, Natale M, Bilancia D, Nicolella G, Di Nota A, Comella G (2000 ), Randomized trial comparing cisplatin, gemcitabine, and vinorelbine with either cisplatin and gemcitabine or cisplatin and vinorelbine in advanced non-small-cell lung cancer: interim analysis of a phase III trial of the Southern Italy; Cooperative Oncology Group.
  20. ↑ Schiller JH, Harrington D, Belani CP, Langer C, Sandler A, Krook J, Zhu J, Johnson DH (2002 ) Comparison of four chemotherapy regimens for advanced non-small-cell lung cancer (; Eastern Cooperative Oncology Group).
  21. ↑ Schiller, D Tilden, M Aristides, M Lees, A Kielhorn, N Maniadakis, S Bhalla (2004) In France as in other countries of Europe, le cost of traitement d'un cancer bronchique non à petites cellules par cisplatine-gemzar est inférieur à celui des associations cisplatine-vinorebine, cisplatine-paclitaxel ou cisplatine-docétaxel (Retrospective cost analysis of gemcitabine in combination with cisplatin in non-small cell lung cancer compared to other combination therapies in Europe Lung Cancer); Revue des Maladies Respiratoires Vol 22, N° spécial juin 2005 pp. 185-198 Doi:RMR-06-2005-22-6-0761-8425-101019-200505465 J; 43: 101-12.
  22. ↑ "The future of sustainable energy is in the exploitation of rare earths". Phys.org. Retrieved 2022-02-16.
  23. ↑ "A Scarcity of Rare Metals Is Hindering Green Technologies". Yale E360. Retrieved 2022-02-16.
  24. ↑ "Call for evidence". European Commission. Retrieved 8 April 2023.
  25. ↑ Rizzo, A.; Goel, S.; Grilli, M.L.; Iglesias, R.; Jaworska, L.; Lapkovskis, V.; Novak, P.; Postolnyi, B.O.; Valerini, D. The Critical Raw Materials in Cutting Tools for Machining Applications: A Review. Materials 2020, 13, 1377. https://doi.org/10.3390/ma13061377
  26. ↑ "Critical raw materials - Fifth list 2023 of critical raw materials for the EU". European Commission. 16 March 2023.
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