Background

The numerous revolutions in Crete, during and after the Greek War of Independence (1821, 1833, 1841, 1858, 1866, 1878, 1889, 1895, 1897)^[15] were the result of the Cretans' desire for enosis — union with Greece.^[16] In the Cretan revolution of 1866, the two sides, under the pressure of the Great Powers, came to an agreement, which was finalized in the Pact of Chalepa. Later the Pact was included in the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin, which was supplementing previous concessions granted to the Cretans — e.g. the Organic Law Constitution (1868) designed by William James Stillman. In summary, the Pact granted a large degree of self-government to Greeks in Crete as a means of limiting their desire to rise up against their Ottoman overlords.^[17] However the Muslims of Crete, who identified with Ottoman Empire, were not satisfied with these reforms, as in their view the administration of the island was delivered to the hands of the Christian Greek population. In practice, the Ottoman Empire failed to enforce the provisions of the Pact, thus fueling the existing tensions between the two communities; instead, the Ottoman authorities attempted to maintain order by dispatching substantial military reinforcements during 1880–1896. Throughout that period, the Cretan Question was a major issue of friction in the relations of independent Greece with the Ottoman Empire.

In January 1897, violence and disorder escalated on the island, thus polarizing the population. Massacres against the Christian population took place in Chania^{[18][19][20][21]} and Rethimno.^[21][22][23] The Greek government, pressured by public opinion, intransigent political elements, extreme nationalist groups such as Ethniki Etaireia,^[24] and the reluctance of the Great Powers to intervene, decided to send warships and army personnel to defend the Cretan Greeks.^[25] The Great Powers had no option then but to proceed with the occupation of the island, but they were late. A Greek force of about 2,000 men had landed at Kolymbari on 3 February 1897,^[26] and its commanding officer, Colonel Timoleon Vassos declared that he was taking over the island "in the name of the King of the Hellenes" and that he was announcing the union of Crete with Greece.^[27] This led to an uprising that spread immediately throughout the island. The Great Powers decided to blockade Crete with their fleets and land their troops, thus stopping the Greek army from approaching Chania.^[28]

Events at Akrotiri

Venizelos at Akrotiri, 1897.

Venizelos, at that time, was on an electoral tour of the island. Once he "saw Canea in flames",^[29] he hurried to Malaxa, near Chania, where a group of about 2,000 rebels had assembled and established himself as their header. He proposed an attack, along with other rebels, on the Turkish forces at Akrotiri in order to displace them from the plains (Malaxa is at a higher altitude). Venizelos' subsequent actions at Akrotiri form a central set-piece in his myth. People composed poems on Akrotiri and his role there; editorials and articles spoke about his bravery, his visions, and his diplomatic genius as the inevitable accompaniment of later greatness.^[18] Venizelos spent the night in Akrotiri and a Greek flag was raised. The Ottoman forces requested help from the foreign admirals and attacked the rebels, with the ships of the Great Powers bombarding the rebel positions at Akrotiri. A shell threw down the flag, which was raised up again immediately. The mythologizing became more pronounced when we come to his actions in that February, as the following quotes display:

On 20th of February [he] was ordered by the admirals to lower the flag and disband his rebel force. He refused!^[30]

Venizelos turned towards the port of Souda, where the warships were anchored, and explained: "You have cannon-balls – fire away! But our flag will not come down" ... [after the flag was hit] Venizelos ran forward; his friends stopped him; why expose a valuable life so uselessly?^[31]

There was that famous day in February 1897 when ... he rejected the orders of the Protecting Powers and in the picturesque phrase in the Greek newspapers "defied the navies of Europe"^[32]

Under the smooth diplomat of today is the revolutionist who prodded the Turks out of Crete and the bold chieftain who camped with a little band of rebels on a hilltop above Canea and there he defied the consuls and the fleets of all the [Great] Powers!^[33]

On the same evening of the bombardment, Venizelos wrote a protest to the foreign admirals, which was signed by all the chieftains present at Akrotiri. He wrote that the rebels would keep their positions until everyone was killed from the shells of European warships in order not to let the Turks remain in Crete.^[34] The letter was deliberately leaked to international newspapers, evoking emotional reactions in Greece and in Europe, where the idea of Christians, who wanted their freedom, being bombarded by Christian vessels, caused popular indignation. Throughout Western Europe much popular sympathy for the cause of the Christians in Crete was manifested, and much popular applause was bestowed on the Greeks.^[28]

War in Thessaly

Ethnic composition of the Balkans according to the Atlas Général Vidal-Lablache, Librairie Armand Colin, Paris, 1898.

Ethnic composition map of the Balkans by the Greek diplomat Ioannis Gennadius,^[35] published by the English cartographer E. Stanford in 1877.

The Great Powers sent a verbal note on 2 March to the governments of Greece and the Ottoman Empire, presenting a possible solution to the "Cretan Question", under which Crete to become an autonomous state under the suzerainty of the Sultan.^[13] The Porte replied on 5 March, accepting the proposals in principle, but on 8 March the Greek government rejected the proposal as a non-satisfactory solution and instead insisted on the union of Crete with Greece as the only solution.

As a representative of the Cretan rebels, Venizelos met the admirals of the Great Powers on a Russian warship on 7 March 1897. Even though no progress was made at the meeting, he persuaded the admirals to send him on a tour of the island, under their protection, in order to explore the people's opinions on the question of autonomy versus union.^[36] At the time, the majority of the Cretan population initially supported the union, but the subsequent events in Thessaly turned the public opinion towards autonomy as an intermediate step.

In reaction to the rebellion of Crete and the assistance sent by Greece, the Ottomans had relocated a significant part of their army in the Balkans to the north of Thessaly, close to the borders with Greece.^[37] Greece in reply reinforced its borders in Thessaly. However, irregular Greek forces, who were members of the Ethniki Etairia (followers of the Megali Idea) acted without orders and raided Turkish outposts,^[38] leading the Ottoman Empire to declare war on Greece on 17 April. The war was a disaster for Greece. The Turkish army was better prepared, in large part due to the recent reforms carried out by a German mission under Baron von der Goltz, and the Greek army was in retreat within weeks. The Great Powers again intervened, and an armistice was signed in May 1897.^[39]

Conclusion

The defeat of Greece in the Greco-Turkish war, costing small territorial losses at the borderline in northern Thessaly and an indemnity of £4,000,000,^[39] turned into a diplomatic victory. The Great Powers (Britain, France, Russia, and Italy), following the massacre in Heraklion on 25 August,^[21][40][41] imposed a final solution on the "Cretan Question"; Crete was proclaimed an autonomous state under Ottoman suzerainty.

Venizelos played an important role in this solution, not only as the leader of the Cretan rebels but also as a skilled diplomat with his frequent communication with the admirals of the Great Powers.^[41] The four Great Powers assumed the administration of Crete; and Prince George of Greece, the second son of King George I of Greece, became High Commissioner, with Venizelos serving as his minister of Justice from 1899 to 1901.^[42]

Background

The boundaries of the Balkan states before the Balkan Wars.

At the time, there were diplomatic contacts with the Ottoman Empire to initiate reforms in Macedonia and in Thrace, which at the time were under the control of the Ottoman Empire, for improving the living conditions of the Christian populations. Failure of such reforms would leave a single option to remove the Ottoman Empire from the Balkans, an idea that most Balkan countries shared. This scenario appeared realistic to Venizelos because the Ottoman Empire was under a constitutional transition, and its administrative mechanism was disorganized and weakened.^[55] There was also no fleet capable of transporting forces from Asia Minor to Europe, while in contrast, the Greek fleet was dominating the Aegean Sea. Venizelos did not want to initiate any immediate major movements in the Balkans, until the Greek army and navy were reorganized (an effort that had begun from the last government of Georgios Theotokis) and the Greek economy was revitalized.^[56] In light of this, Venizelos proposed to Ottoman Empire to recognize the Cretans the right to send deputies to the Greek Parliament, as a solution for closing the Cretan Question. However, the Young Turks (feeling confident after the Greco-Turkish war in 1897) threatened that they would make a military walk to Athens, if the Greeks insisted on such claims.

Balkan League

With the Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pasic in 1913

Venizelos, seeing no improvements after his approach with the Turks on the Cretan Question and at the same time not wanting to see Greece remain inactive as in the Russo-Turkish War in 1877 (where Greece's neutrality left the country out of the peace talks), he decided that the only way to settle the disputes with Ottoman Empire, was to join the other Balkan countries, Serbia, Bulgaria and Montenegro, in an alliance known as the Balkan League. Crown Prince Constantine was sent to represent Greece to a royal feast in Sofia, and in 1911 Bulgarian students were invited to Athens.^[57] These events had a positive impact and on 30 May 1912 Greece and the Kingdom of Bulgaria signed a treaty that ensured mutual support in case of a Turkish attack on either country. Negotiations with Serbia, which Venizelos had initiated to achieve a similar agreement, were concluded in early 1913,^[58] before that there were only oral agreements.^[59]

Montenegro opened hostilities by declaring war on the Ottoman Empire on 8 October 1912. On 17 October 1912, Greece along with her Balkan allies, declared war on the Ottoman Empire, thus joining the First Balkan War.^[58] On 1 October, in a regular session of the Parliament Venizelos announced the declaration of war to the Ottomans and accepting the Cretan deputies, thus closing the Cretan Question, with the declaration of the union of Crete with Greece. The Greek population received these developments very enthusiastically.

First Balkan War – The first conflict with Prince Constantine

Venizelos with Constantine

The outbreak of the First Balkan War caused Venizelos a great deal of trouble in his relations with Crown Prince Constantine. Part of the problems can be attributed to the complexity of the official relations between the two men. Although Constantine was a Prince and the future King, he also held the title of army commander, thus remaining under the direct order of the Ministry of Military Affairs, and subsequently under Venizelos. But his father, King George, in accordance with the constitutional conditions of the time, had been the undisputed leader of the country. Thus in practical terms, Venizelos' authority over his commander of the army was diminished due to the obvious relation between the Crown Prince and the King.

In these conditions, the army started a victorious march to Macedonia under the command of Constantine. Soon the first disagreement between Venizelos and Constantine emerged, and it concerned the aims of the army's operations. The Crown Prince insisted on the clear military aims of the war: to defeat the opposed Ottoman army as a necessary condition for any occupation, wherever the opponent army was or was going, and the main part of the Ottoman army soon started retreating to the north towards Monastir. Venizelos was more realistic and insisted on the political aims of the war: to liberate as many geographical areas and cities as fast as possible, particularly Macedonia and Thessaloniki; thus heading east. The debate became evident after the victory of the Greek army at Sarantaporo, when the future direction of the armies' march was to be decided. Venizelos intervened and insisted that Thessaloniki, as a major city and strategic port in the surrounding area, should be taken at all costs and thus a turn to the east was necessary. In accordance to his views, Venizelos sent the following telegraph to the General Staff:

Salonique à tout prix!^[60]

Territorial changes as a result of the First Balkan war, as of April 1913.

and tried to keep frequent communication with the key figure, the King, in order to prevent the Crown Prince from marching north.^[60] Subsequently, although the Greek army won the Battle of Giannitsa situated 40 km west of Salonika, Constantine's hesitation in capturing the city after a week had passed, led into an open confrontation with Venizelos. Venizelos, having accurate information from the Greek embassy in Sofia about the movement of the Bulgarian army towards the city, sent a telegram to Constantine in a strict tone, holding him responsible for the possible loss of Thessaloniki. The tone in Venizelos' telegram and that in the answer from Constantine that followed to announce the final agreement with the Turks, is widely considered as the start of the conflict between the two men that would lead Greece into the National Schism during World War I. Finally, on 26 October 1912, the Greek army entered Thessaloniki, shortly ahead of the Bulgarians.^[61] But soon a new reason of friction emerged due to Venizelos' concern about Constantine's acceptance of the Bulgarian request to enter the city. A small Bulgarian unit, which soon became a full division, moved into the city and immediately started an attempt to establish a condominium in spite of initial assurances to the contrary, showing no intentions to leave. After Venizelos' protest Constantine asked him to take the responsibility (as a prime minister) by ordering him to force them out, but that was hardly an option since that would certainly lead to confrontation with the Bulgarians. To Venizelos' view, since Constantine allowed the Bulgarians to enter the city, he now passed the responsibility of a possible conflict with them to him, in an attempt to deny his initial fault. To Constantine, it was an attempt by Venizelos to get involved in clearly military issues. Most historians agree that Constantine failed to see the political dimensions of his decisions. As a consequence both incidents increased mutual misunderstanding shortly before Constantine's accession to the throne.

Once the campaign in Macedonia was completed, a large part of the Greek army under the Crown Prince was redeployed to Epirus, and in the Battle of Bizani, the Ottoman positions were overcome and Ioannina taken on 22 February 1913. Meanwhile, the Greek navy rapidly occupied the Aegean islands, which were still under Ottoman rule. After two victories, the Greek fleet established naval supremacy over the Aegean, preventing the Turks from bringing reinforcements to the Balkans.^[62][63]

On 20 November, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria signed a truce treaty with Turkey. It followed a conference in London, in which Greece took part, although the Greek army still continued its operations in the Epirus front. The conference led to the Treaty of London between the Balkan countries and Turkey. These two conferences gave the first indications of Venizelos' diplomatic efficiency and realism. During the negotiations and facing the dangers of Bulgarian maximalism, Venizelos succeeded in establishing close relations with the Serbs. A Serbian-Greek military protocol was signed on 1 June 1913, ensuring mutual protection in case of a Bulgarian attack.

Second Balkan War

Demonstration in Greece during the Balkan Wars with the words "Long Live Venizelos".

Venizelos with other participants in Bucharest peace treaty negotiations

Despite all this, the Bulgarians still wanted to become a hegemonic power in the Balkans and made excessive claims to this end, while Serbia asked for more territory than what was initially agreed with the Bulgarians. Serbia was asking for a revision of the original treaty since it had already lost north Albania due to the Great Powers' decision to establish the state of Albania in an area that had been recognized as a Serbian territory of expansion under the prewar Serbo-Bulgarian treaty. Bulgarians also laid claims on Thessaloniki and most of Macedonia. In the conference of London, Venizelos rebuffed these claims, citing the fact that it had been occupied by the Greek army,^[64] and that Bulgaria had denied any definite settlement of territorial claims during the pre-war discussions, as it had done with Serbia.

The rupture between the allies, due to the Bulgarian claims, was inevitable, and Bulgaria found herself standing against Greece and Serbia. On 19 May 1913, a pact of alliance was signed in Thessaloniki between Greece and Serbia. On 19 June, the Second Balkan War began with a surprise Bulgarian assault against Serbian and Greek positions.^[65] Constantine, now King after his father's assassination in March, neutralized the Bulgarian forces in Thessaloniki and pushed the Bulgarian army further back with a series of hard-fought victories. Bulgaria was overwhelmed by the Greek and Serbian armies, while in the north Romania interfered against Bulgaria and the Romanian army was marching towards Sofia; Ottomans also took advantage of the situation and retook most of the territory taken by Bulgaria. The Bulgarians asked for a truce. Venizelos went to Hadji-Beylik, where the Greek headquarters were, to confer with Constantine on the Greek territorial claims in the peace conference. Then he went to Bucharest, where a peace conference was assembled. On 28 June 1913 a peace treaty was signed with Greece, Montenegro, Serbia and Romania on one side and Bulgaria on the other. Thus, after two successful wars, Greece had doubled its territory by gaining most of Macedonia, Epirus, Crete and the rest of the Aegean Islands,^[66] although the status of the latter remained as yet undetermined and a cause of tension with the Ottomans.

Dispute over Greece's role in World War I

Bust of Eleftherios Venizelos in Belgrade, Serbia.

With the outbreak of World War I and the Austro-Hungarian invasion of Serbia, a major issue started regarding the participation of Greece and Bulgaria in the war. Greece had an active treaty with Serbia which was the treaty activated in the 1913 Bulgarian attack that caused the Second Balkan War. That treaty was envisaged in a purely Balkan context and was thus invalid against Austria-Hungary, as was supported by Constantine and his advisors.

The situation changed when the Allies, in an attempt to help Serbia, offered Bulgaria the Monastir–Ochrid area of Serbia and the Greek Eastern Macedonia (the Kavala and Drama areas) if she joined the Entente. Venizelos, having received assurances over Asia Minor if the Greeks participated in the alliance, agreed to cede the area to Bulgaria.^[67]

But Constantine's anti-Bulgarism made such a transaction impossible. Constantine refused to go to war under such conditions, and the men parted. As a consequence, Bulgaria joined the Central Powers and invaded Serbia, an event that led to Serbia's final collapse. Greece remained neutral. Venizelos supported an alliance with the Entente, not only believing that Britain and France would win but also that it was the only choice for Greece because the combination of the strong Anglo-French naval control over the Mediterranean and the geographical distribution of the Greek population, could have ill effects in the case of a naval blockade, as he characteristically remarked:

One cannot kick against geography!^[68]

On the other hand, Constantine favored the Central Powers and wanted Greece to remain neutral.^[69] He was influenced both by his belief in the military superiority of Germany and also by his German wife, Queen Sophia, and his pro-German court. He therefore strove to secure a neutrality, which would be favorable to Germany and Austria.^[70]

In 1915, Winston Churchill (then First Lord of the Admiralty) suggested to Greece to take action in Dardanelles on behalf of the allies.^[71] Venizelos saw this as an opportunity to bring the country on the side of the Entente in the conflict. However, the King and the Hellenic Army General Staff disagreed and Venizelos submitted his resignation on 21 February 1915.^[70] Venizelos' party won the elections and formed a new government.

National Schism

The "Triumvirate of National Defence" in Thessaloniki. L-R: Admiral Pavlos Kountouriotis, Venizelos, and General Panagiotis Danglis.

Even though Venizelos promised to remain neutral, after the elections of 1915, he said that Bulgaria's attack on Serbia, with which Greece had a treaty of alliance, obliged him to abandon that policy. A small-scale mobilization of the Greek army took place.

The dispute between Venizelos and the King reached its height shortly after that, and the King invoked a Greek constitutional provision that gave the monarch the right to dismiss a government unilaterally. Meanwhile, using the excuse of saving Serbia, in October 1915, the Entente disembarked an army in Thessaloniki,^[72] after invitation by Venizelos. Prime Minister Venizelos's action enraged Constantine.

The dispute continued between the two men, and in December 1915, King Constantine forced Venizelos to resign for a second time and dissolved the Liberal-dominated parliament, calling for new elections. Venizelos left Athens and moved back to Crete. Venizelos did not take part in the elections, as he considered the dissolution of Parliament unconstitutional.^[73][74]

The 1st Battalion of the National Defence army marches before the White Tower on its way to the front.

On 26 May 1916 the Fort Rupel (a significant military fort in Macedonia) was unconditionally surrendered by the royalist government to Germano-Bulgarian forces.^[75] This produced a deplorable impression. The Allies feared a possible secret alliance between the royalist government and the Central Powers, placing their armies in grave danger in Macedonia. On the other hand, the surrender of Fort Rupel for Venizelos and his supporters meant the beginning of the destruction of Greek Macedonia. Despite German assurances that the integrity of the Kingdom of Greece would be respected, they were unable to restrain the Bulgarian forces, which had started dislocating the Greek population, and by 4 September Kavala was occupied.^[76]

On 16 August 1916, during a rally in Athens, and with the support of the allied army that had landed in Thessaloniki under the command of General Maurice Sarrail, Venizelos publicly announced his total disagreement with the Crown's policies. The effect of this was to further polarize the population between the royalists (also known as anti-Venezelists), who supported the crown, and Venizelists, who supported Venizelos. On 30 August 1916, Venizelist army officers organized a military coup in Thessaloniki, and proclaimed the "Provisional Government of National Defence". Venizelos, along with Admiral Pavlos Kountouriotis and General Panagiotis Danglis agreed to form a provisional government, and on 9 October, they moved to Thessaloniki and assumed command of the National Defence to oversee the Greek participation in the allied war effort. The triumvirate, as the three men became known, had formed this government in direct conflict with the Athens political establishment.^[77] There they founded a separate "provisional state" including Northern Greece, Crete, and the Aegean Islands, with the support of the Entente.^[78] Primarily, these areas comprised the "New Lands" won during the Balkan Wars, in which Venizelos enjoyed broad support, while "Old Greece" was mostly pro-royalist. However, Venizelos declared, "we are not against the King, but against the Bulgarians". He didn't want to abolish the monarchy and continued his efforts to persuade the King to join the Allies, blaming his "bad advisors" for his stance.

The National Defence government started assembling an army for the Macedonian front and soon participated in operations against the Central Powers forces.

"Noemvriana" – Greece enters World War I

French troops in Athens, with the Acropolis in the background, after the Noemvriana.

In the months following the creation of the provisional government in Thessaloniki in late August, negotiations between the Allies and the king intensified. The Allies wanted further demobilization of the Greek army as a counterbalance to the royalist government's unconditional surrender of Fort Rupel and the military evacuation of Thessaly to ensure the safety of their troops in Macedonia. On the other hand, the king wanted assurances that the Allies would not officially recognize Venizelos' provisional government or further support it, guarantees that Greece's integrity and neutrality would be respected, and a promise that any war material surrendered to the Allies would be returned after the war.^[79]

The Franco-British use of Greece's territory in co-operation with the Venizelos government^[i] throughout 1916 was opposed in royalist circles and therefore increased Constantine's popularity, and caused much excitement and several anti-Allied demonstrations took place in Athens.^[77] Moreover, a growing movement had been developed in the army among lower officers, led by military officers Ioannis Metaxas and Sofoklis Dousmanis, determined to oppose disarmament and the surrender of any war materials to the Allies.^[80]

Venizelos reviews a section of the Greek army on the Macedonian front during the First World War, 1918. He is accompanied by Admiral Pavlos Koundouriotis (left) and General Maurice Sarrail (right).

The Allies' pressure on the government of Athens continued. On the next day, 24 November, du Fournet presented a new ultimatum ending on 1 December to the government of Athens, demanding the immediate surrender of at least ten mountain batteries.^[81] The admiral made a last effort to persuade the king to accept France's demands. He advised the king that according to his orders, he would land an Allied contingent with the aim to occupy certain positions in Athens until his demands were satisfied.^[81] In reply, the King claimed that he was pressed by the army and the people not to submit to disarmament and refused to make any commitment. However, he promised that the Greek forces would receive orders not to fire against the Allied contingent.^[82] Despite the gravity of the situation, both the royalist government and the Allies let the events take their own course. The royalist government decided to reject the admirals' demands on 29 November, and armed resistance was organized. By 30 November, military units and royalist militia (the epistratoi, "reservists") from surrounding areas had been recalled and gathered in and around Athens (in total over 20,000 men^[83][84][85]) and occupied strategic positions, with orders not to fire unless fired upon.^[82] On the other hand, the Allied authorities failed in their assessment of the prevailing temper. A diplomat characteristically insisted that the Greeks were bluffing, and in the face of force, they would "bring the cannons on a plater"; a viewpoint that Du Fournet also shared.^[82]

Greek lithograph depicting Venizelos along with the principal Allied leaders of World War I, David Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau, Ferdinand Foch and Woodrow Wilson.

The Allies landed a small contingent in Athens on 1 December [O.S. 18 November] 1916. However, it met organized resistance, and an armed confrontation took place for a day till a compromise was reached. After the evacuation of the Allied contingent from Athens the following day, a royalist mob raged through the city for three days targeting supporters of Venizelos. The incident became known as the Noemvriana in Greece, which was using the Old Style calendar at the time, and drove a deep wedge between the Venizelists and their political opponents, deepening what would become known as the National Schism.

After the armed confrontation in Athens, on 2 December [O.S. 19 November] 1916, Britain and France officially recognized the government under Venizelos as the lawful government, effectively splitting Greece into two separate entities.^[86] On 7 December [O.S. 24 November] 1916, Venizelos' provisional government officially declared war on the Central Powers.^[87][88] In reply, a royal warrant for the arrest of Venizelos was issued and the Archbishop of Athens, under pressure by the royal house,^[89] anathematised him.^[90] The Allies unwilling to risk a new fiasco, but determined to solve the problem, established a naval blockade around southern Greece, which was still loyal to the king, and that caused extreme hardship to people in those areas.^[91] In June, France and Great Britain decided to invoke their obligation as "protecting powers", who had promised to guarantee a constitutional form for Greece at the time the Kingdom was created, to demand the king's resignation.^[92] Constantine accepted and on 15 June 1917 went to exile, leaving his son Alexander on the throne as demanded (whom the Allies considered as pro-Entente), instead of his elder son and crown prince, George.^[93][94] His departure was followed by the deportation of many prominent royalists, especially army officers such as Ioannis Metaxas, to exile in France and Italy.

The course of events paved the way for Venizelos to return to Athens on 29 May 1917, and Greece, now unified, officially entered the war on the side of the Allies. Subsequently, the entire Greek army was mobilized (though tensions remained inside the army between supporters of the monarchy and supporters of Venizelos) and began to participate in military operations against the Central Powers army on the Macedonian front.

Conclusion of World War I

Painting depicting Greek military units in the World War I Victory Parade in Arc de Triomphe, Paris. July 1919.

Venizelos in 1919.

By the fall of 1918, the Greek army numbering 300,000 soldiers, was the largest single national component of the Allied army in the Macedonian front.^[95] The presence of the entire Greek army gave the critical mass that altered the balance between the opponents in the Macedonian front. Under the command of French General Franchet d'Espèrey, a combined Greek, Serbian, French, and British force launched a major offensive against the Bulgarian and German army, starting on 14 September 1918. After the first heavy fighting (see Battle of Skra), the Bulgarians gave up their defensive positions and began retreating back towards their country. On 24 September, the Bulgarian government asked for an armistice, which was signed five days later.^[96] The Allied army then pushed north and defeated the remaining German and Austrian forces that tried to halt the Allied offensive. By October 1918, the Allied armies had recaptured all of Serbia and were preparing to invade Hungary. The offensive was halted because the Hungarian leadership offered to surrender in November 1918, marking the Austro-Hungarian empire's dissolution. The breaking of the Macedonian front was one of the important breakthroughs of the military stalemate and helped to bring an end to the War. Greece was granted a seat under Venizelos at the Paris Peace Conference.^[97]

Treaty of Sèvres and assassination attempt

Photo of the members of the commission of the League of Nations created by the Plenary Session of the Preliminary Peace Conference, Paris, France 1919. Venizelos is on the right.

Following the conclusion of World War I, Venizelos took part in the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 as Greece's chief representative. During his absence from Greece for almost two years, he acquired a reputation as an international statesman of considerable stature.^[3][4] President Woodrow Wilson was said to have placed Venizelos first in point of personal ability among all delegates gathered in Paris to settle the terms of Peace.^[98]

Map of Greater Greece after the Treaty of Sèvres, when the Megali Idea seemed close to fulfillment, featuring Eleftherios Venizelos.

In July 1919, Venizelos reached an agreement with the Italians on the cession of the Dodecanese, and secured an extension of the Greek area in the periphery of Smyrna. The Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria on 27 November 1919, and the Treaty of Sèvres with the Ottoman Empire on 10 August 1920, were triumphs both for Venizelos and for Greece.^[3][99][100] As the result of these treaties, Greece acquired Western Thrace, Eastern Thrace, Smyrna, the Aegean islands Imvros, Tenedos and the Dodecanese except Rhodes.^[99][ii]

The assassination attempt by Greek royalists at the Gare de Lyon.

In spite of all this, fanaticism continued to create a deep rift between the opposing political parties and to impel them towards unacceptable actions. On his journey home on 12 August 1920, Venizelos survived an assassination attack by two royalist soldiers at the Gare de Lyon railway station in Paris.^[101] This event provoked unrest in Greece, with Venizelist supporters engaging in acts of violence against known anti-Venizelists, and provided further fuel for the national division. The persecution of Venizelos' opponents reached a climax with the assassination of the idiosyncratic anti-Venizelist Ion Dragoumis^[70] by paramilitary Venizelists on 13 August.^[102] After his recovery Venizelos returned to Greece, where he was welcomed as a hero because he had liberated areas with Greek populations and had created a state stretching over "five seas and two continents".^[70]