The grey-zone (also grey zone, gray zone, and gray-zone) describes the space in between peace and war in which state and non-state actors engage in competition.

Definition

Use of the term grey-zone is widespread in national security circles, but there is no universal agreement on the definition of grey-zone, or even whether it is a useful term, with views about the term ranging from "faddish" or "vague", to "useful" or "brilliant".[1]

The grey-zone is defined as "competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality" by the United States Special Operations Command.[2] A key element of operations within the grey-zone is that they remain below the threshold of an attack which could have a legitimate conventional military response (jus ad bellum).[3][4] One paper defined it as "coercive statecraft actions short of war", and a "mainly non-military domain of human activity in which states use national resources to deliberately coerce other states".[1] The Center for Strategic and International Studies defines the grey-zone as "the contested arena somewhere between routine statecraft and open warfare."[5] British Defence Secretary Ben Wallace called the grey-zone "that limbo land between peace and war."[6]

According to Vincent Cable, examples of grey-zone activities include undermining industrial value chains or oil and gas supplies, money laundering, and the use of espionage and sabotage.[7] According to Lee Hsi-ming "gray zone conflict is characterized by using the threat of force to create fear and intimidation."[8]

History

The term grey-zone was coined by the United States Special Operations Command[9][10] and published in a 2015 white paper.[11] The concept of the grey-zone is built on existing military strategies; however, information technology has created radical new spaces which have expanded what is possible. Modern hybrid warfare and political warfare operations primarily occur in the grey-zone.[12]

In the late 2010s, China escalated to grey-zone warfare with Taiwan in an attempt to force unification with the smaller country.[13] Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration has had to expand rapidly to meet the rising grey-zone challenge.[14] China's grey-zone operations against Taiwan in the maritime domain are meant to establish presence while maintaining plausible deniability.[15]

Concerns

It is generally believed that non-democratic states can operate more effectively in the grey-zone as they are much less limited by domestic law and regulation. It can also be very hard for democratic states to respond to grey-zone threats because their legal and military systems are geared towards seeing conflicts through the sense of war and peace with little preparation or consideration for anything in between. This can lead democratic states to either dramatically overreact or under-react when faced with a grey-zone challenge.[16]

Examples of Grey Zone Warfare

China's Grey Zone activities in the Arctic region

The international political situation in the Arctic

Maritime disputes in the Arctic, characterised by actions that are neither explicitly warlike nor entirely peaceful, are on the rise. This mirrors global trends in regions such as the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea.[17] The geopolitical landscape in the Arctic is emphasised, with growing rivalry between the United States and China, turning the region into a new arena for great-power competition.[18] The literature emphasises geopolitical tensions, with the U.S. viewing China's activities as a threat to its Western influence and military interests, leading to an escalation of great-power rivalry in the Arctic.[19][20]

The US sees the Chinese activities as a way of capturing US/Western power and at the same time collecting military information and developing military strategies for the region. The literature points towards that great-power rivalry in the region is gaining traction.

The US has held the position of unipolarity for about 10 years but has since then lost a part of that power.[21] Their loss of power can be seen in recent instances such as China’s advance into the South China Sea.[19] The US is scared that China’s greyzone tactics in the South China Sea can be transferred to the Arctic and that it is becoming the new arena for great-power rivalry.[22][23][24] While China accuses the US for spying on them in the South China Sea, the US fears and accuses China for doing the same in the Arctic.[18] Western states do not trust China enough to believe that they are just there for research. Consequently, the literature points towards a paranoid US/NATO that are afraid of future Chinese Arctic missions.[25] The increasing tension between NATO (led by the US) and China will probably spillover in the Arctic, which NATO and China can influence with their increasing armament, as China becomes more and more active in the Arctic. Although the overall goal for the Arctic states and China is to keep the region a “non-tension” arena, then the increase in tension and rivalry between the great powers has the opposite effect. Norway, Canada, Finland, Denmark and the US all acknowledge that the growing tension in the region will lead to the Arctic becoming militarised.[26][27][28][29][25]

China has already deployed military vessels to the region several times and  also acknowledges the fact that great-power rivalry in the region increases the need for military in the region in the future.[30][31][32] However, China downplays their military interest in the region and says they are only there for investments and research.[33]

China's history and interest in the Arctic region

China's strategic focus on the Arctic is driven by economic considerations, particularly the potential for new shipping routes and resource extraction resulting from the melting ice.[34] This part of the review explores China's historical involvement in the Arctic, examining the economic and strategic motivations underpinning its increased greyzone presence in the region.

China has deemed the Arctic and its high seas as essential to its strategic and economic interests.[35] China’s presence in the Arctic region is a contemporary complication as the dispute recently has started to occur as a result of global warming. The man-made phenomenon has in recent years accelerated the melting of ice in the Arctic region which makes it ideal for China’s interest in new shipping routes.[35][31] The new alternative shipping routes through the Arctic will in the future save time as many kilometres can be saved and the avoidance of the US-monitored Malacca-strait.[35][36][37]

China has therefore in recent years shown an increased interest in the Arctic area because of the economic aspect of future shipping routes through the Arctic caused by global warming.[38] Furthermore, as more and more of the seabed is getting accessible with the disappearance of the icecape, it also opens up to the extraction of critical minerals and oil at the Arctic seabed.[6] The elements of having new strategic and time saving shipping routes together with extraction of natural resources that can help the technological development of the Chinese military makes the Arctic hugely interesting.

China's role and Greyzone speculations in the Arctic

China's entry into the Arctic scene in 2012, marked by the navigation of the icebreaker "Snow Dragon," and subsequent observer status in 2013, signifies a strategic shift in the region.[32] It is evident that the West fear that these new Chinese ice-breakers and other polar research technology can be used for dual-use.[39][40] These new icebreakers are equipped with technology that can scan the oceanography and scientific conducting equipment.[41]

Following the expedition in 2012, China was granted observer status in the Arctic region in 2013.[35] In 2018, China proclaimed and deemed themselves a “near-Arctic” state. They have since then started to deploy research icebreakers to the region but it is argued that these research vessels also do recognition and acquire important research for the Chinese military.

Furthermore, China refers to UNCLOS that all states have the right to conduct maritime research regardless of its geographic location and uses this as legitimation for their research expeditions.[42][43] The absence of a comprehensive regional treaty complicates the assessment of China's claims as a "near-Arctic" state, China has deemed the area as “common heritage to mankind”.[35][31][44]

China’s huge interest in the commercial (Polar Silk Road) and trade aspects of new shipping routes, as well as scientific research with military and commercial applications, increase China’s influence in the Arctic.[45]

The military and greyzone aspect of this is further enlarged in “China’s White Paper on Arctic Policy'' where the policy paper points out the security aspect of the Arctic.[31] China emphasises the importance of technological development which they argue the Arctic can help them with, as this is meant to modernise the Chinese military.[41][32] China’s military presence in the Arctic is still limited, because of their limiting “observer” status but the research is expected to evolve and modernise their military. When making it seem like the research is for civilian technological advancement but it also benefits the military, states operate in the greyzone. The security aspect of the Arctic is therefore rather important to China and its military development, because research and natural resources in the Arctic region can help China acquire knowledge and move the technological development into their favour.[32]

Technological advancement is not uncommon for states to emphasise as this allows them to enhance military presence and improve capacity.[32]

China does nothing that the US and Russia have not done in the Arctic. China’s economic and research interests in the region is not uncommon either. The Arctic states all support the need for scientific research, development of navigation, fishing regulations and economic expansion as all this has been very limited before.[26][27][28][29][25] The only difference is that China does not have Arctic territory and the wish for Chinese control over natural and scarce resources are also greyzone activities. They are a non-military factor but in the event of a war, these resources can be used to conduct war.[46]

The scholarly literature posits that China's Arctic activities induce scepticism, particularly when considering its reputation for engaging in greyzone activities. It is conceivable that similar tactics employed in civilian research aim to have dual-use functionalities.[39] Not only has their greyzone activities the possibility of modernising their military, but China also has the opportunity to gain strategic knowledge on opponents and their military operations.

The literature points towards the Arctic as a strategic security arena with many natural resources and where great-powers conduct greyzone activities.[47] The literature on China’s Arctic behaviour gives differentiated interests and ways of operating that are far from either clearly peaceful or clearly militarization and therefore becomes greyzone activities.[48] Chinese scientific research in the Arctic, supported by its growing fleet of icebreakers and unmanned systems, builds operational knowledge in the Arctic. In the future it can help to execute submarine missions, identify resource deposits and a better understanding of the future of the Arctic.[45] However, China’s operations also hold elements of grey zone warfare tactics, which  have the potential to have consequences for the relationship between the Arctic states and their peaceful goal for the region.

Iran's greyzone activities near the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb

Iran is allegedly involved in greyzone activities in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb where there have been numerous incidents of mine attacks, drone strikes, sabotage, and ships being detained.[49][50] The attacks and insecurity in both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb cause great global economic stress as both locations are strategically important for the global oil supply.[51][52] This means that many nations and shipping companies are interested in protecting vessels from being attacked. Consequently, this has led to increased security and monitoring in the regions by states like the US and Saudi Arabia but also private shipping companies.[53] Since 2019, there has been an ongoing conflict between Iran and Israel which has been coined the “Shadow War” by scholars in international relations. Iran and Israel have accused each other of conducting clandestine tactics against one another such as drone strikes and sea mining which have caused much distress in the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb.[49][50]

The Strait of Hormuz

The Strait of Hormuz plays an important role in the global economy as roughly a quarter of the world’s oil is shipped through that chokepoint. Because of its economic importance as well as its narrow chokepoint, some analysts fear a naval barricade by Iran or a military conflict would cause a massive disruption to the global oil supply, making prices extremely high until ships would be able to continue to sail through the strait without being attacked.[52][54] This occurred in the 1980s in the Tanker War between Iraq and Iran where both nations conducted numerous attacks on ships that were trafficking oil to either Iran or Iraq.[55]

In recent years, there have been numerous attacks occurring in the Persian Gulf near the strait including an alleged torpedo attack on a Marshall Islands-flagged vessel and an attack with two explosive devices towards a Panama-flagged vessel in 2019. Furthermore, there are multiple cases of sabotage attacks and even a case with a British-flagged oil tanker being detained by Iran.[56] While experts believe that Iran does not have the capacity to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, they still think it possible that Iran would undermine global oil prices by sabotaging tankers in the strait with mines, small anti-ship missiles, and small craft with explosive devices, etc. Experts argue that Iran will manage to keep harassing and conducting the small, greyzone attacks without creating an all-out war with either the US or the Arab coalition countries.[57][54] For the shipping industry, these attacks led to massive increases in insurance rates and oil prices. As a response, shipping companies utilize different methods of maneuvering such threats by hiring unarmed security experts. The US, UK, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and other nations have established a naval coalition to maintain maritime surveillance and communicate with merchant vessels as a means to countermeasure these threats.[58][59]

The Bab el-Mandeb

The Bab el-Mandeb has geostrategic importance to global trade because of the connection between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. The strait serves as an essential seaway for many oil tankers due to the strait’s small size, thereby making international shipping and trade an easy target for greyzone warfare tactics. Such tactics include missiles, bombs, sea mines, suicide boats, and remote-controlled explosive devices.[60] The strait is important to global trade and the shipping industry as the Bab el-Mandeb serves as the third-largest maritime choke point in the world with ships trafficking around 6.2 barrels of oil daily in 2018. As such, the Bab el-Mandeb serves as a highly strategic route for natural gas and oil and a pivotal connection for Europe and Asia’s maritime commerce.[61][62] In recent decades, the waters near the Bab el-Mandeb have been an extremely dangerous area for international commerce with many ships being attacked by either pirates or terrorist groups. However, in recent years those threats have diminished but instead have been replaced with the escalation of the civil war in Yemen with the government forces fighting against the Iran-backed Houthi forces. According to the US, Iran provides financial support, training, and material equipment such as drones, missiles, and bombs. The Houthis are seen as the largest security threat to navigation in those waters with numerous attacks such as the attack on two Saudi oil tankers in 2018, A suicide boat attack on a Spannish-flagged tanker in 2016, and a rocket-propelled grenade attack on a Tuvalu-flagged tanker in 2016. Furthermore, the Houthis have deployed sea mines that have detonated on commercial cargo ships as well as local fishing vessels.[63]

The Shadow War in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb

Since 2019, there has been an ongoing 'Shadow War' between Israel and Iran in the waters near Bab el-Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz, where there have been a series of greyzone attacks with sea mines, missile attacks, and drone strikes against commercial and navy vessels.[50][49] Iran has been accused of attacking Israeli commercial vessels and container ships. Likewise, Israel is allegedly involved in greyzone attacks against Iranian tankers heading for Syria. In addition, an Iranian naval vessel was also attacked by Israel in 2021 with claims that the Iranian vessel was supporting the Houthi rebels while the Iranians claimed that the vessel was used to combat piracy. While Iran and Israel are the main belligerents, other nations such as the US, UK, and Syria are also involved as Iran continues their attempt to ship oil to Syria despite the US and EU oil embargo. Iran is dependent on safe passage through the Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal. Iranian-flagged risk being seized by the UK if they try to ship oil into Syria by entering the Gibraltar Strait which happened in 2019 when the Iranian-flagged tanker Grace 1 was shipping around 2 million barrels of oil to Syria but was detained by the UK. The tanker was released a month later on the condition that the ship would not sail to Syria.[64]

As a response to Israel’s war on Hamas since October 2023, the Houthi forces have intensified their attacks on ships in the Red Sea with drones and rockets. The rebels have also hijacked at least one ship. As a result, numerous firms from the shipping industry, including Maersk and the Mediterranean Shipping Company, stated that their vessels would avoid sailing in that area. The US has accused Iran of being involved in the planning of the Houthi forces’ operations. Iran has denied any involvement.[65] According to the US, the Houthis’ attacks heavily affect global economic trade since 10-15% of the world’s global shipping passes through the Red Sea. In response, the US has formed Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG) with the goal of protecting the freedom of navigation and maritime commerce in the Red Sea. The US states that the OPG will serve as a multinational security operation, forming a coalition of the willing with more than 20 nations volunteering in order to counter the Houthis’ attacks.[66]

What makes these attacks a part of greyzone warfare is that it is legally difficult to substantiate the accusations that Iran is behind both the direct and indirect attacks in the international courts. Legal proceedings depend on conclusive evidence of an armed attack in order for the attacked flag-state to claim a right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The limpet sea mines are easy to conceal which makes it challenging for an attacked flag-state to prove that they were specifically targeted for this attack. As such, there has been a case where the US was unable to prove that Iran was behind a sea mine attack despite evidence that the mine was manufactured in Iran.[67] The involvement of Houthi rebels complicates matters further because Article 51 of the UN Charter dictates a state’s right to self-defense but the charter does not account for actions committed by private actors. As such, this prevents neutral states from holding Iran accountable as the attacks are often committed by the Houthis whom Iran holds no responsibility over.[68]

Relation with hybrid warfare

The concept of grey-zone conflicts or warfare is distinct from the concept of hybrid warfare,[69] although the two are intimately linked as in the modern era states most often apply unconventional tools and hybrid techniques in the grey-zone.[70] However, both concepts of ‘hybrid war’ and ‘grey zones’ strategies are built around the idea of the existence of some intermediate state between (negative) peace and international as well as non-international armed conflict.[71] Many of the unconventional tools used by states in the grey-zone such as propaganda campaigns, economic pressure and the use of non-state entities do not cross over the threshold into formalized state-level aggression.[16]

See also

References

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