The Jagiellonian compromise is an electoral system for two-tier voting bodies originally proposed in 2004[1] for the Council of the European Union as a way of achieving "one person, one vote" within the union. The compromise was analysed by various authors[2] and received attention in the popular press.[3] The system is based on the square root law of Penrose, which implies that a priori voting power defined by the Penrose–Banzhaf index of a member of a voting body is inversely proportional to the square root of its size. Hence the number of votes obtained by a representative of a state with population is proportional to . Jagiellonian Compromise is based on a single criterion only. Decision of the Council of the union of member states is taken if the sum of the weights of states voting in favour of a given proposal exceeds the qualified majority quota equal to

For a generic distribution of population among states of the union, the optimal threshold decreases with as .[4]

See also

References

Footnotes

  1. Słomczyński & Życzkowski 2004.
  2. Kirsch 2010; Pukelsheim 2010; Ratzer 2006.
  3. Highfield, Roger (14 July 2004). "The EU Constitution Is 'Unfair', According to Game Theorists". The Telegraph. London. Retrieved 30 August 2017.
  4. Życzkowski & Słomczyński 2012.

Bibliography


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