The American Future Scout and Cavalry System (FSCS) and British Tactical Reconnaissance Armoured Combat Equipment Requirement (TRACER) were a joint U.S.–British reconnaissance vehicle program.

The program was begun to replace the UK's Sabre and Scimitar reconnaissance vehicles.[1] The U.S. joined later and sought to replace their M3 Bradley.

A British Scimitar in 2004

The future scout concept was conceived at a November 1995 meeting of senior armor officials. At this meeting, officials decided a future scout and main battle tank would be the centerpiece of the Army's armor modernization plan.[2]

A U.S. Army M3 Bradley in 1985.

In March 1996, the Army Armor Center at Fort Knox recommended that the Army develop a future scout vehicle to be ready for production around 2004 to 2006. The Army considered the M8 Armored Gun System and the M113 as the basis for the chassis. The group projected that the future scout program would cost $1 billion.[2] The Armor Center recommended that the Army forgo the M3A3 Bradley upgrade, and instead upgrade 278 M3A2s with Operation Desert Storm fixes. The Armor Center concluded the Bradley was approaching its design limit and had many disadvantages as a scout—namely, it lacked stealth and its 25 mm cannon lacked "growth potential against future threats." The Armor Center also suggested the Army consider a joint project with the Marine Corps, which was drafting requirements for the Future Light Combat Vehicle.[3]

Notional model of Future Scout and Cavalry System

In October 1996 the U.S. and British armies signed a letter of intent to jointly work on a future scout vehicle.[4] Developing the program with British cooperation was expected to save the U.S. Army 30 percent to 40 percent through the engineering and manufacturing development phase.[5]

The UK was given contracting authority for phase one (called the project definition phase in the UK, and the advanced technology demonstration phase in the U.S.).[6] Phase two (engineering and manufacturing development in the U.S. and full-scale development in the UK) would proceed with the phase one participants. One contractor would be downselected for low-rate production.[7]

In November 1996, the U.S. Army updated its future scout mission need statement.[8]

As of January 1998, the U.S. Army sought to acquire 1095 of the vehicles, and the British Army sought 235.[9]

In January 1999, the UK awarded SIKA International (a joint venture of Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems) and LANCER (a consortium led by GEC Marconi), each a $147 million contract for the 42-month-long advanced technology demonstration (ATD) phase of the project.[6]

Cancelation

In a January 1999 report, an Office of the Secretary of Defense official called for a Defense Acquisition Board review of the FSCS program. The OSD official criticized the vehicle's proposed $3–5 million unit cost versus the $3.6 million M3A3 Bradley. The report said that while the Army mission need statement specified a lightly armored vehicle, the vehicle specified in the requirements was more like a "medium tank" comparable to the canceled M8 Armored Gun System.[10]

In February, the U.S. Army began working with the UK to revise the requirements of the joint program to resolve the OSD's concerns.[11] The new requirements, which went into effect in March, pacified the OSD. Many requirements were loosened at the OSD's request: for example, the new requirements clarified that the primary armament need not be an autocannon.[12]

In October, U.S. Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki laid out his vision for a lighter, more transportable armored force. The Army launched the Interim Armored Vehicle acquisition program, and began investing in "leap-ahead" technologies for Shinseki's "objective force" Future Combat Systems Manned Ground Vehicles program.[13]

In order to help pay for the IAV, the U.S. Army decided to terminate FSCS. In December 1999 the Army said it would end its participation in the joint program after the completion of the advanced technology demonstration (ATD) phase. At the time, the UK was still very much committed to its participation in the project.[14] Congress, believing that continued development of the program was unnecessary given the Army's disinterest, deleted funding for completing the ATD phase. The Pentagon persuaded Congress to restore funding in October 2000.[15]

In October 2001, the U.S. and British Army mutually canceled the program. The U.S. hoped to leverage the technologies developed with FSCS in the Future Combat Systems program. The British were expected to do the same with the Future Rapid Effect System.[16]

See also

References

  1. ↑ Baumgardner, Neil (8 June 2001). "Britain Seeking Information On Off-The-Shelf Vehicles For FRES Program". Defense Daily International. ProQuest 217294908. Retrieved 17 February 2022.
  2. 1 2 "New Scout Vehicle Could Cost $1 Billion: Armor Center: Price Tag for Developing New Tank Could Reach $4 Billion". Inside the Army. Vol. 8, no. 11. Inside Washington Publishers. 18 March 1996. pp. 1, 7. JSTOR 43978982. Retrieved 8 February 2022.
  3. ↑ "Ft. Knox Plan Carries $40 Million Bill: Armor, Infantry Leaders to Take Future Scout Vehicle Ideas to TRADOC". Inside the Army. Vol. 8, no. 32. Inside Washington Publishers. 12 August 1996. pp. 1, 11–12. JSTOR 43979368. Retrieved 9 February 2022.
  4. ↑ "U.S., U.K. Sign Letter of Intent for Work on Future Scout Vehicle". Inside the Army. Vol. 8, no. 42. Inside Washington Publishers. 21 October 1996. p. 5. JSTOR 43979553. Retrieved 8 February 2022.
  5. ↑ "U.S. Cost Avoidance of $140m Possible: Top Pentagon Official Approves Plans for Cooperative FSCS Development". Inside the Army. Vol. 9, no. 8. Inside Washington Publishers. 24 February 1997. pp. 1, 8–9. JSTOR 43979850. Retrieved 8 February 2022.
  6. 1 2 Winograd, Erin Q. (8 February 1999). "42-month Tech Demo Kicks Off After Delay: Army Awards Two Contracts for Future Scout and Cavalry System". Inside the Army. Vol. 11, no. 5. Inside Washington Publishers. JSTOR 43983454. Retrieved 16 February 2022.
  7. ↑ Daniel, G. Dupont (12 May 1997). "U.S., U.K. Officials Gather in Michigan to Discuss Future Scout System". Inside the Army. Vol. 9, no. 19. Inside Washington Publishers. p. 12. JSTOR 43980063. Retrieved 16 February 2022.
  8. ↑ "Critical Intelligence". Inside the Pentagon. Vol. 12, no. 47. Inside Washington Publishers. 21 November 1996. p. 8. JSTOR 43992681. Retrieved 16 February 2022.
  9. ↑ George Cahlink; H. Diehl McKalle (12 January 1998). "U.S. Wants 1.095 Systems. U.K. Seeks 335: Congress Told of Plans for $987 Million Future Scout System Effort". Inside the Army. Vol. 10, no. 1. Inside Washington Publishers. JSTOR 43980696. Retrieved 8 February 2022.
  10. ↑ Winograd, Erin Q. (25 January 1999). "PA&E Wants Immediate Review: OSD Questions Soundness of Army's Future Scout and Cavalry System". Inside the Army. Vol. 11, no. 3. Inside Washington Publishers. p. 1, 8. JSTOR 43983415. Retrieved 16 February 2022.
  11. ↑ Winograd, Erin Q. (1 March 1999). "In Response to PA&E Concerns...: U.S., U.K. Negotiating Future Scout Contract Changes With Industry". Inside the Army. Vol. 11, no. 8. Inside Washington Publishers. p. 6. JSTOR 43983517. Retrieved 16 February 2022.
  12. ↑ Winograd, Erin Q. (22 March 1999). "Key Performance Parameters Relaxed: Contract Adjustments for Future Scout Satisfy U.S., British Officials". Inside the Army. Vol. 11, no. 11. Inside Washington Publishers. pp. 3–4. JSTOR 43981980. Retrieved 16 February 2022.
  13. ↑ MacRae, Catherine (14 October 1999). "Service Wants to Be Lighter, Faster, More Lethal: Army Chief of Staff's 'vision' Is Focused on Medium-weight Force". Inside the Army. Vol. 15, no. 41. Inside Washington Publishers. p. 6. JSTOR 43995956. Retrieved 7 February 2022.
  14. ↑ Winograd, Erin Q. (22 May 2000). "Divergent Views on Future Scout Program". Inside the Army. No. Erin Q. Winograd. Inside Washington Publishers. pp. 2–3. JSTOR 43984778. Retrieved 16 February 2022.
  15. ↑ Strohm, Chris (2 October 2000). "Still No Plans for Army to Participate in EMD: Reprogramming Approval Puts Future Scout Program Back on Track". Inside the Army. Vol. 12, no. 39. Inside Washington Publishers. pp. 1, 14–15. JSTOR 43985047. Retrieved 16 February 2022.
  16. ↑ Winograd, Erin Q. (22 October 2001). "But Technology Will Not Be Abandoned: British, U.S. Officials Announce an End to Joint Future Scout Program". Inside the Army. Vol. 13, no. 42. Inside Washington Publishers. pp. 1, 9–11. JSTOR 24819092. Retrieved 8 February 2022.
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