Yablonski murder

The United Mine Workers was in turmoil by this time. President W. A. Boyle was autocratic and bullying, and not well liked. From the beginning of his administration, Boyle faced significant opposition from rank-and-file miners and UMWA leaders. Miners' attitudes about their union had also changed. Miners wanted greater democracy and more local autonomy for their local unions. There was a widespread belief that Boyle was more concerned with protecting mine owners' interests than those of his members. Grievances filed by the union often took months — sometimes years — to resolve, lending credence to the critics' claim. Wildcat strikes occurred as local unions, despairing of UMWA assistance, sought to resolve local disputes with walkouts.

In 1969, Joseph "Jock" Yablonski challenged Boyle for the presidency of UMWA. In an election widely seen as corrupt, Boyle beat Yablonski in the election held on December 9 by a margin of nearly two-to-one (80,577 to 46,073). Yablonski conceded the election, but on December 18, 1969, asked the United States Department of Labor (DOL) to investigate the election for fraud. He also filed five civil suits against the union on charges related to the election.

On New Year's Eve, December 31, 1969, three hitmen shot Yablonski, his wife, Margaret, and his 25-year-old daughter, Charlotte, as they slept in the family home in Clarksville, Pennsylvania. The bodies were discovered on January 5, 1970. The killings had been ordered by Boyle, and the hitmen had been paid $20,000 in embezzled union funds for the job.

A few hours after the funeral, two of Yablonski's sons and several of the miners who had supported Yablonski met in the basement of the church where the service was held. They met with attorney Joseph Rauh and drew up plans for a reform caucus within the United Mine Workers.^[3]

The day after news of the Yablonski killings was published, 20,000 miners in West Virginia walked off the job in a one-day strike — they believed that Boyle was responsible for the murders.

On January 8, 1970, Yablonski's attorney waived the right to further internal review by the union and requested that DOL initiate an immediate investigation of the election. The US Attorney General ordered the FBI also to assist in the investigation. By 1972 DOL had concluded that the election was fraudulent. On January 17, 1972, the United States Supreme Court granted Mike Trbovich, a 51-year-old coal leader from District 5 (Yablonski's district), permission to intervene in the DOL suit as a complainant — keeping the suit alive.

The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) of 1959 regulates the internal affairs of labor unions, requiring regular secret-ballot elections for local union offices and providing for federal investigation of election fraud or impropriety. DOL is authorized under the act to sue in federal court to have the election overturned. By 1970, however, only three international union elections had been overturned by the courts.^[4]

Miners for Democracy

Miners for Democracy (MFD) formed in April 1970 while the DOL investigation was underway. Its members included most of the miners who belonged to the West Virginia Black Lung Association and many of Yablonski's supporters and campaign staff. MFD's support was strongest in southwestern Pennsylvania, eastern Ohio, and panhandle and northern West Virginia, but MFD supporters existed in nearly all affiliates. The chief organizers of Miners for Democracy included Yablonski's sons, Ken and Joseph (known as "Chip") Yablonski, both labor attorneys, and Trbovich and others. Initially, the group's sole purpose was to keep the DOL investigation of the Mine Workers alive.^[5]

DOL filed suit in federal court in 1971 to overturn the 1969 UMWA election. As the case progressed, MFD turned its focus toward building a union-wide political organization capable of contesting any new election. A number of union members were seen as potential MFD candidates, including Miller, Trbovich and miner Elijah Wood.

On May 1, 1972, Judge William Bryant threw out the results of the 1969 UMWA international union elections. Bryant scheduled a new election to be held over the first eight days of December 1972. Additionally, Bryant agreed that DOL should oversee the election, to ensure fairness.^[6]

Over the weekend of May 26 to May 28, 1972, 800 MFD delegates from 16 UMWA districts gathered in Wheeling, West Virginia. Miller and Trbovich both sought the group's endorsement for president, with Trbovich the leading candidate going into the convention. But by Sunday, Miller had been elected MFD's presidential candidate, receiving 70.9 votes out of to Trbovich's 57.1 votes. As a consolation, Trbovich was elected the group's vice presidential nominee, receiving 84.1 votes. Harold Patrick, national co-chairman of MFD, received 76.4 votes to win the secretary-treasurer nod.^[7]

Miller's victory over Trbovich was something of a surprise. Many believed the delegates had been swayed UMWA District 17 president Jack Perry. Perry had been a founding member of the Logan County Black Lung Association. According to Cecil Roberts, then an MFD supporter and now president of UMWA, "...Arnold Miller's election as UMWA president in 1972 was largely attributable to Jack's impassioned lobbying of MFD convention delegates to support Miller."^[8] Many delegates felt Miller was more likely to win any election than Trbovich. Many miners held discriminatory views toward people of Eastern European descent like Trbovich, while others felt he was too militant. Miller, meanwhile, already had a strong base in the black-lung movement.^[3] Trbovich, who had been campaign manager for Yablonski's campaign, was bitterly disappointed.^[9]

On December 22, 1972, the Labor Department certified Miller as UMWA's next president. The vote was 70,373 for Miller and 56,334 for Boyle.

Arnold Miller was the first candidate to defeat an incumbent president in UMWA history, and the first native West Virginian to lead the union.

Weakness of leadership

Miller proved to be a weak president. "Whoever talked to him last had his ear," one staffer said.^[10] He was markedly indecisive, changing his mind repeatedly and putting off decisions. Eventually, the reform movement he led began to stall.^[11] "He was not an exceptionally good United Mine Workers President..."^[5]

It became clear that Miller, whose only previous administrative experience had been running a 200-member local, was not capable of managing a 250,000-member union. Miller proved naive about union politics and only reluctantly controlled meetings (most of which turn into "parliamentary pandemonium, quarreling, shouting and ... nearly coming to blows"). As meetings spiraled out of control, Miller would become curt, even angry.^[12][3]

Staff problems

Miller named a number of Yablonski supporters to prominent positions in the union. He appointed 35-year-old Chip Yablonski general counsel. John Sulka became executive safety director, and Meyer Bernstein director of public and international affairs.

But Miller also staffed his team with a number of young who came from outside of the mines, and often unions altogether. Many of them were idealistic progressives who supported Miller's reformist cause and had filled critical roles in the presidential campaign. These appointments and others like them caused friction in the Miller administration from the start. "He suddenly felt he was not educated enough to run the Union. He relied on some of the college people who were non miners and they tended to isolate Arnold from the coal miners."^[5] The college-educated staffers also alienated other, less educated, more conservative, leaders such as Trbovich, who claimed the young staffers were "leftwing radicals from New York and Boston..."^[12]

Miller also purged the executive board that had been appointed under the Boyle administration. Miller dismissed 20 of the 24 board members, then named 13 of his own and seven of Yablonski's supporters to the board. Miller believed he had given himself a solid majority on the board, but to his dismay Boyle cronies still dominated the board. Miller assumed that miners who had won election in 1972 were MFD supporters. But many were actually Boyle men who had been elected by the rank-and-file merely because they were better known than the MFD candidates. They had supported MFD as a means of hanging onto power, not because they supported Miller or the democracy movement. Even many Miller supporters on the board broke with him before the year was out, claiming that he was mismanaging the union.^[12]

Miller's district appointments suffered the same fate. Most district officers owed their loyalty to Boyle and the district leaders he had appointed. Miller drew on this pool of talent for his district appointments, and ended up appointing more Boyle men. Conflict between the Miller administration and district leaders quickly broke into the open.^[5]

Early successes

Despite the Miller administration's problems, Miller made a number of changes which democratized UMWA. At the union's 1973 convention, Miller won support for virtually all the changes he proposed. Among the most important reforms was letting UMWA districts elect their own presidents and other officers.^[12] Miller "certainly got democracy restored to that the Union and the local union meetings were always democratic meetings with some of the guys serving as the local officers -- they were good guys. It was good to see they were accountable to their membership."^[5]

Miller's democracy movement extended to collective bargaining as well. The union's constitution was amended to give union members the right to ratify contracts, as well as formulate contract proposals. Tentative agreements were now reviewed by a "bargaining council" rather than the president and his aides. Additionally, Miller built a large and competent research department to assist with contract negotiations.^[11][13]

A third Miller reform came in the area of politics. Miller established UMWA's first PAC, the Coal Miners' Political Action Committee (COMPAC). COMPAC gave the union the financial and political leverage it needed in order to become more effective on the state and national level. COMPAC put financial muscle behind the union's political endorsements, giving the union legislative access and more political influence. COMPAC quickly began pressing Congress on the need for a federal black-lung program by lobbying and organizing demonstrations.^[12]

Finally, Miller greatly expanded the union's workplace health and safety staff. The number of staff rose dramatically from three in 1972 to 40 in 1975.^[12][9]

Miller's reforms won the union significant new numbers of members. Miners had once shunned the union for its authoritarian ways but now joined in large numbers. By the end of 1974, UMWA had started 50 organizing campaigns. Eighteen went to election, and the union won 10 of these. In Miller's first two years in office, UMWA membership climbed by 77,000 members to 277,000—nearly a 40 percent increase.^[9][14][15]

Collapse of the reform movement

As Miller's problems mounted, his reform program collapsed. He began sacrificing additional reform proposals to ensure the success of the few which had already been implemented. He openly fought with Yablonski supporters, and became suspicious of the young intellectuals on his staff as well. He also became somewhat paranoid about his enemies: He sold his home in D.C. and moved to a small, secure apartment in Arlington, Virginia, kept a baseball bat by his desk, and carried a Smith & Wesson .38 handgun to local union meetings. His leadership style became increasingly autocratic, and he adopted the trappings of power (for example, like Boyle, he began using a huge limousine) and fired staff frequently.^{[11][16][12][3]}

Miller's first major political defeat came in early 1973. For the first time in UMWA history, a budget was not only proposed but was also debated by the executive board. Miller budgeted $14 million for organizing, additional safety staff, and government relations. But he lost control of the council meeting. He could not obtain a motion to cut off debate or hold a vote, and the meeting ran for 14 days. In the end, the board cut $2 million from Miller's budget.^[12]

In early 1974, Trbovich led a second executive board rebellion against Miller. After lengthy and acrimonious debate, the board voted to cut the Miller-proposed budget for organizing and political activity by a third.^[12]

Trbovich subsequently accused Miller of financial mismanagement, and filed charges with the U.S. Dept. of Labor against Miller. Stung by its previous lax enforcement, the agency quickly began investigating Trbovich's charges. Miller and secretary-treasurer Patrick labeled the accusations "politically inspired", and the charges were eventually found to be without merit.^[17] In retaliation, Miller took away Trbovich's supervision of the union's safety division.^[9]

1974 strike

During these troubles, Miller faced renegotiating a national coal collective bargaining agreement. UMWA's bargaining demands included a 40 percent wage and benefit increase, stronger health and safety language, guaranteed sick leave, and higher employer contributions to the union's health and pension funds.^[18] UMWA struck on November 12, 1974. A tentative agreement was rejected twice by UMWA's bargaining council (once prior to and once during the strike). Finally the government threatened to bring a Taft-Hartley injunction against the union to force the miners back to work. A settlement was reached on December 10.^[19][13]

The 1974 agreement was the richest contract in UMW history. But the membership's unhappiness with the new collective bargaining agreement led to a continuing wave of wildcat strikes, and significantly slowed the union's organizing growth.^[9][10][20]

Continuing troubles

In 1975, Miller fired John Sulka, the union's executive safety director. The cause of his termination was disagreement over how strongly the union should continue to pressure employers on safety. Miller felt miners were not giving his reforms a chance to work, while Sulka wished to continue to move forward.^[21] Later that year, Chip Yablonski resigned as general counsel.^[22]

Miller became increasingly defensive. He added security at union headquarters, and demanded that all staff travel plans be cleared through him so he could detect plotting. When he suspected one of his secretaries of plotting with a political challenger, he had the door to her office removed.^[23]

Trbovich, too, continued to attack Miller. In early June, 1974, Trbovich circulated a letter among UMWA's board of directors accusing Miller — and, to a lesser degree, Patrick — of gross financial mismanagement. He accused Miller of overspending and paying raises to staff who contributed little to the union's mission, and reiterated charges that Miller had let the union fall into "radical" hands. Miller denied the charges, and counter-attacked. He accused Trbovich of keeping a public relations consultant on the payroll for six weeks longer than necessary, forcing Miller to fire her. The board's meeting turned into a shouting match between Miller and Trbovich. By that time, Trbovich had the support of 16 of the members on the board and an opposition slate was forming to challenge Miller in the 1977 presidential election.^[9]

Miller's troubles continued into 1976 and 1977. At a meeting of United Mine Workers locals in northeastern Pennsylvania in early May, Miller and Trbovich engaged in a shouting match in front of the members. "This union is on the verge of financial disaster!" shouted Trbovich. Miller snapped back: "That's a damn lie and you know it!" Immediately after the meeting, Miller suspended Trbovich for insubordination. His claim was that Trbovich had refused to investigate financial and management problems in the union's organizing programs out West. The union's board of directors reinstated Trbovich in late May. Then the board, led by Trbovich, cut $3 million from Miller's proposed $13.9 million budget. In February 1977, as Congress debated surface mining reclamation legislation, Trbovich led a revolt of 15 board members. Despite Miller's support for a ban on surface mining, the letter opposed the new legislation and suggested a state-by-state regulatory approach instead.^[15][12][24]

The ongoing internal problems continued to affect UMWA organizing. In late 1976, the union lost an organizing drive in Bell County, Kentucky, because of the political fractiousness.^[12]

Under Miller's leadership, the union had a lukewarm response to support for women miners. A 1978 landmark complaint to the Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs was brought by the Coal Employment Project, a women's advocacy organization. Named were 153 coal companies which were ordered to hire one women for every three men until women constituted 20% of the workforce. The same year, a CEP endorsement request resulted in the failure of Miller to submit to the International Executive Board. By the next quarter, with a concerted effort by UMWA women, the IEB passed the support endorsement. Nine women were among the 1,267 delegates to the UMWA constitutional convention a year later. Miller's vice president and successor, Sam Church, responded with an off-color joke when pressed by the women for the addition to the contract for affirmative action and improved sickness and accident coverage.^[25][26]

Re-election

By the end of 1977, Miller's popularity had significantly waned. Some rank-and-file miners had signed a petition calling for his resignation.^[11]

So that elections would not interfere with collective bargaining talks at the end of the year, UMWA's elections were moved to June.

The 1977 election was a three-way race. Opposing Miller were secretary-treasurer Harry Patrick, running on the MFD ticket, and executive board member Lee Roy Patterson, running as head of the Boyle faction.^[12][23][27]

Initially, Miller's candidacy was somewhat conservative. He focused his campaign on his record of ending corruption, enhancing mine safety and winning sizeable pay increases. But in order to shore up support during the campaign, Miller agreed to seek additional democratic reforms advocated by militant district leaders. One reform would have given local unions the right to strike on their own.^[20]

Miller won re-election. He received 40 percent of the vote. With only half of all eligible miners voting, Miller won the race with the support of just 20 percent of the membership. Few observers believed he would emerge strong enough from the election to control the union's executive board and bargaining council and avoid a national strike in December.^[12][23][28]

Elected as vice president was Sam Church, a former Boyle supporter and local president who became a field representative and then international representative in the Miller administration. When Church punched a former UMWA staffer in a dispute over a leak to the press, Miller asked Church to be his running-mate.^[3] Elected secretary-treasurer was Willard "Bill" Esselstyn, a 31-year-old miner from District 5 and a former Yablonski supporter.

1977–78 strike

When the national bituminous coal contract expired in 1977, UMWA struck on December 6.

The right of local unions to strike was the primary issue in the negotiations. During his re-election campaign, Miller had been forced to accept as a collective bargaining goal the right to strike over local issues. But the owners rejected Miller's demand because they saw he was unable to bring wildcat strikers back to the bargaining table.^[29][30][20]

UMWA's negotiating position was not an enviable one. Power utilities and iron and steel manufacturers had built up stockpiles of coal, the number of coal mines controlled by UMWA had fallen,^[28] and the 1973 oil crisis had ended (lowering the demand for coal).^[13]

Miller had also hurt himself. He had fired many of his supporters^[28][12] and most of the research department staff. Miller relied instead on a law firm for bargaining advice, which caused confusion among UMWA negotiators and sent mixed signals to the employers.^[13]

Sporadic violence broke out, and a few governors mobilized their state police and National Guard. But for the most part, the coal fields remained calm.^[31]

A tentative agreement was reached February 6, 1978, which imposed penalties for wildcat strikes and chronic absenteeism, turned the union's health and pension plans over to the employers, forced workers to pay part of their health insurance premiums, and instituted a bonus system for productivity increases.^[32]

The union's bargaining council rejected the tentative agreement on February 12.^[13][32]

A second tentative agreement was reached. UMWA spent $40,000 on television and radio advertising to sell the pact, which backfired.^[33] The UMWA membership rejected the tentative contract by a margin of 2 to 1.^[34]

On March 6, President Jimmy Carter invoked the national emergency provision of the Taft–Hartley Act and a federal district court issued a temporary injunction ordering the miners back to work on March 9.^[31][34] The striking miners ignored the injunction, and the federal government did little to enforce the order.

But a growing number of union members had backed off their earlier demand for the right to strike over local issues. Many miners began to realize that the strikes were hurting the union's organizing chances and lowering employer contributions to the union health and pension funds (which were near bankruptcy).^[20]

Eventually, UMWA and mine negotiators settled on new, improved dispute resolution procedures which they hoped would lower the number of wildcat strikes.^[29][35] Once more, Miller and his leadership worked hard to convince members that the contract was a good one.^[33] This time, the miners approved the tentative contract by vote of 57 percent to 43 percent.^[34]

The pact was widely seen as concessionary for giving up union health and pension benefits, imposing health insurance premium co-pays, reimposing productivity-based wages, and failing to win the right to strike over local issues.^[11]

While ratification of the agreement was a victory for Miller, it also signaled the end of his effectiveness as leader of the United Mine Workers of America.