Center for China and Globalization
全球化智库
AbbreviationCCG
Formation2008 (2008)
FounderWang Huiyao; Mable Miao Lu
TypeThink tank
HeadquartersBeijing
President
Wang Huiyao
Secretary General
Mable Lu Miao
Websitewww.ccg.org.cn

The Center for China and Globalization (CCG) is a Chinese think tank based in Beijing. It is registered as a non-governmental organization, though its independence from the Chinese Communist Party has been disputed.[1][2][3] It also occasionally suffered attacks and censorship within China.[4][5]

Leadership

CCG was founded in 2008 by Wang Huiyao and Mable Miao Lu, scholars who are reported to have ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).[2][6] Wang is a central committee member of the Jiusan Society, one of the country's eight legally-permitted minor political parties under the direction of the CCP.[7][8] Wang has also served as a counselor to the State Council appointed by Premier Li Keqiang.[9][10] According to The Economist, Wang is a "something of a go-between for technocratic government ministries, Chinese entrepreneurs and foreign embassies in Beijing."[11] Victor Gao is a vice president of the CCG.[12]

Political stance

Residency permits

As a counselor to the State Council, CCG's Wang Huiyao and Mabel Lu Miao have advocated for easing the residency requirements for foreign citizens in China.[13][14][15] In 2020, the Ministry of Justice published a draft legislation outlining new paths to permanent residence, sparking controversy among Chinese nationalists who opposed the move. Wang was vilified by nationalists for supporting the permanent residency scheme.[4]

Criticism of external propaganda

In 2021, CCG hosted an event critical of China's external propaganda as "mirroring internal propaganda in external propaganda."[16][1] Chinese scholars at a CCG event "were stark about the country's global image."[17] As a result, CCG and the scholars were targeted and media posts related to the event began to disappear.[5]

Controversy

CCG is a member of an alliance of think tanks, coordinated by the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party, that support the Belt and Road Initiative.[18]

Wang Huiyao, president of CCG, was previously a vice chairman of the Western Returned Scholars Association (WRSA). He has been a standing director of the China Overseas Friendship Association (COFA).[2] Both WRSA and COFA are under the jurisdiction of the United Front Work Department (UFWD), where Wang was once on the advisory board.[3] In a 2015 press release, CCG claimed that it was “initiated by the China Global Talents Committee and the WRSA's Suggestions Committee.”[19]

CCG has argued that it is financed primarily by private and corporate donors without government funding,[20] and that Wang's involvement with the WRSA was merely an advisory role on its council, not formal employment.[21] In 2023, CCG denied being “founded, run, or financed” by the WRSA, explaining that to navigate the stringent legal requirements for private think tanks, the organization had

incorrectly said WRSA was one initiator of CCG. In trying to survive, exist, and develop, CCG staff took advantage of what was plausibly available in an imperfect development environment and felt then it was preferable to mention what could be its most plausible link to an organization with over 100 years of history—longer than the CPC or PRC.[21]

Wilson Center panel

In 2018, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars invited CCG president Wang Huiyao to a Kissinger Institute panel on Chinese influence operations in Washington, DC on May 9. In a letter to the Wilson Center, U.S. Senator Marco Rubio, then chair of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, asked the think tank to disclose Wang's affiliation with the United Front Work Department (UFWD).[2] Wang ended up not confirming his attendance as a panelist at the Wilson Center, but visited the Council on Foreign Relations, The Heritage Foundation, and Asia Society instead.[22] He visited the Wilson Center in person in 2019 and spoke virtually at a panel in 2020.[23][24]

Collaboration with Semafor

In March 2023, U.S. news startup Semafor launched its "China and Global Business" initiative in partnership with CCG and the Chinese foreign ministry-affiliated China Public Diplomacy Association. Justin B. Smith, CEO of Semafor, wrote that the company was not "under the illusion that Chinese business leaders or other local groups operate independently of the Chinese Communist Party." Due to Chinese legal requirements, however, CCG "will take on local administrative responsibilities and coordinate with local sponsors, and Semafor will pay CCG for their services. The platform will be exclusively underwritten by corporate partnerships with no financial contributions from our local Chinese partners or the Chinese government."[25]

Sara Fischer and Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, reporting for Axios, wrote that the "speech and activities of Chinese Communist Party-linked groups are strongly influenced by Beijing. Semafor has not detailed how it plans to disclose to its audiences during live events or via digital coverage details about the group's affiliation to the CCP."[26]

See also

References

  1. 1 2 Bandurski, David (2021-07-16). "Seeking China's New Narratives". China Media Project. Archived from the original on 2023-06-24. Retrieved 2023-06-24.
  2. 1 2 3 4 Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany (May 7, 2018). "Rubio Questions D.C. Panel on China Influence". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on May 8, 2018. Retrieved January 25, 2020.
  3. 1 2 Joske, Alex (June 2020). "The party speaks for you". Australian Strategic Policy Institute. JSTOR resrep25132. Archived from the original on 2020-06-09. Retrieved 2022-11-23.
  4. 1 2 "A proposal to help a few foreigners settle in China triggers a furore". The Economist. March 12, 2020. ISSN 0013-0613. Archived from the original on 2023-07-25. Retrieved 2023-06-24.
  5. 1 2 "How China's Ultra-Loyal Web Army Silences Beijing's Critics". Bloomberg News. 2021-08-25. Archived from the original on 2022-01-14. Retrieved 2023-10-06.
  6. ↑ Parello-Plesner, Jonas (May 11, 2018). "The Curious Case of Mr. Wang and the United Front". Hudson Institute. Archived from the original on May 21, 2018. Retrieved January 25, 2020.
  7. ↑ "China's Jiusan Society to elect new leadership". Xinhua. December 3, 2017. Archived from the original on February 15, 2020. Retrieved 2020-02-15.
  8. ↑ Congressional-Executive Commission on China Annual Report 2015 (PDF). Congressional-Executive Commission on China. 2015. p. 233. ISBN 978-0-16-093033-1. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2022-09-21. Retrieved 2022-12-23.
  9. ↑ "Counsellors' Office of the State Council". english.counsellor.gov.cn. Archived from the original on 2019-10-09. Retrieved 2019-10-09.
  10. ↑ "Wang Huiyao". Center for China and Globalization. Archived from the original on 29 March 2015.
  11. ↑ "Why America and Europe fret about China turning inwards". The Economist. October 10, 2022. ISSN 0013-0613. Archived from the original on 2022-10-24. Retrieved 2022-10-25.
  12. ↑ Pinghui, Zhuang (August 19, 2020). "US-China relations: nations failing as global leaders, academics say". South China Morning Post. Archived from the original on October 19, 2020. Retrieved April 17, 2021.
  13. ↑ "北京推出华裔卡试点，行动意外迅速". Voice of America (in Chinese). 2015-12-12. Archived from the original on 2023-06-24. Retrieved 2023-06-24.
  14. ↑ "Chinese "Green Cards": A Win-Win". China-US Focus. China–United States Exchange Foundation. 2017-05-02. Archived from the original on 2023-06-24. Retrieved 2023-06-24.
  15. ↑ "Wang Huiyao: The Base for Choosing Talents Grows from 1.3 billion to 7 billion-Counsellors' Office of the State Council". english.counsellor.gov.cn. Archived from the original on 2023-06-24. Retrieved 2023-06-24.
  16. ↑ Danxu, Yang (2021-05-04). "Chinese authorities' Weibo post lambasted for mocking India's coronavirus crisis, Society News". www.thinkchina.sg. Archived from the original on 2023-10-06. Retrieved 2023-10-06.
  17. ↑ Myers, Steven Lee; Qin, Amy (2021-07-20). "Biden Has Angered China, and Beijing Is Pushing Back". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on 2023-10-12. Retrieved 2023-10-06.
  18. ↑ Joske, Alex; Stoff, Jeffrey (2020-08-03), Hannas, William C.; Tatlow, Didi Kirsten (eds.), "The United Front and Technology Transfer", China's Quest for Foreign Technology (1 ed.), Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, pp. 258–274, doi:10.4324/9781003035084-20, ISBN 978-1-003-03508-4, OCLC 1153338764, S2CID 225395399, archived from the original on 2020-11-22, retrieved 2020-11-26
  19. ↑ "Latest report focuses on China's "green consensus" call for China to lead global climate change action". Center for China and Globalization (in Chinese). October 23, 2015. Archived from the original on December 11, 2018.
  20. ↑ "CCG RELEASE". Center for China and Globalization. Archived from the original on 2023-06-24.
  21. 1 2 CCG Update (2023-03-30). "Facts about CCG". CCG Update. Archived from the original on 2023-11-12. Retrieved 2023-06-24.
  22. ↑ "CCG美国系列活动落下帷幕 拓展智库"二轨外交"新局面". www.ccg.org.cn. Archived from the original on 2023-06-24. Retrieved 2023-06-24.
  23. ↑ CCG. "CCG访美"民间外交"开展二十余场活动：关键时点发出智库声音". Weixin Official Accounts Platform. Archived from the original on 2023-06-27. Retrieved 2023-06-24.
  24. ↑ "21st Century Diplomacy: Foreign Policy is Climate Policy". The Wilson Center. Archived from the original on 2020-10-06. Retrieved 2023-06-24.
  25. ↑ Smith, Justin (2023-03-06). "Why Semafor is launching "China and Global Business"". Semafor. Archived from the original on 2023-06-24. Retrieved 2023-06-24.
  26. ↑ Fischer, Sara; Allen-Ebrahimian (March 7, 2023). "Semafor's China problem". Axios. Archived from the original on March 7, 2023. Retrieved June 24, 2023.
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