Syntax

The basic modal operator of epistemic logic, usually written K, can be read as "it is known that," "it is epistemically necessary that," or "it is inconsistent with what is known that not." If there is more than one agent whose knowledge is to be represented, subscripts can be attached to the operator (${\displaystyle {\mathit {K}}_{1}}$, ${\displaystyle {\mathit {K}}_{2}}$, etc.) to indicate which agent one is talking about. So ${\displaystyle {\mathit {K}}_{a}\varphi }$ can be read as "Agent ${\displaystyle a}$ knows that ${\displaystyle \varphi }$." Thus, epistemic logic can be an example of multimodal logic applied for knowledge representation.^[1] The dual of K, which would be in the same relationship to K as ${\displaystyle \Diamond }$ is to ${\displaystyle \Box }$, has no specific symbol, but can be represented by ${\displaystyle \neg K_{a}\neg \varphi }$, which can be read as "${\displaystyle a}$ does not know that not ${\displaystyle \varphi }$" or "It is consistent with ${\displaystyle a}$'s knowledge that ${\displaystyle \varphi }$ is possible". The statement "${\displaystyle a}$ does not know whether or not ${\displaystyle \varphi }$" can be expressed as ${\displaystyle \neg K_{a}\varphi \land \neg K_{a}\neg \varphi }$.

In order to accommodate notions of common knowledge and distributed knowledge, three other modal operators can be added to the language. These are ${\displaystyle {\mathit {E}}_{\mathit {G}}}$, which reads "every agent in group G knows" (mutual knowledge); ${\displaystyle {\mathit {C}}_{\mathit {G}}}$, which reads "it is common knowledge to every agent in G"; and ${\displaystyle {\mathit {D}}_{\mathit {G}}}$, which reads "it is distributed knowledge to the whole group G." If ${\displaystyle \varphi }$ is a formula of our language, then so are ${\displaystyle {\mathit {E}}_{G}\varphi }$, ${\displaystyle {\mathit {C}}_{G}\varphi }$, and ${\displaystyle {\mathit {D}}_{G}\varphi }$. Just as the subscript after ${\displaystyle {\mathit {K}}}$ can be omitted when there is only one agent, the subscript after the modal operators ${\displaystyle {\mathit {E}}}$, ${\displaystyle {\mathit {C}}}$, and ${\displaystyle {\mathit {D}}}$ can be omitted when the group is the set of all agents.

Semantics

As mentioned above, the logic-based approach is built upon the possible worlds model, the semantics of which are often given definite form in Kripke structures, also known as Kripke models. A Kripke structure ${\displaystyle {\mathcal {M}}=\langle S,\pi ,K_{1},\dots ,K_{n}\rangle }$ for n agents over ${\displaystyle \Phi }$, the set of all primitive propositions, is an ${\displaystyle (n+2)}$-tuple, where ${\displaystyle S}$ is a nonempty set of states or possible worlds, ${\displaystyle \pi }$ is an interpretation, which associates with each state ${\displaystyle s\in S}$ a truth assignment to the primitive propositions in ${\displaystyle \Phi }$, and ${\displaystyle {\mathcal {K}}_{1},...,{\mathcal {K}}_{n}}$ are binary relations on ${\displaystyle S}$ for n numbers of agents. It is important here not to confuse ${\displaystyle K_{i}}$, our modal operator, and ${\displaystyle {\mathcal {K}}_{i}}$, our accessibility relation.

The truth assignment tells us whether or not a proposition ${\displaystyle p}$ is true or false in a certain state. So ${\displaystyle \pi (s)(p)}$ tells us whether ${\displaystyle p}$ is true in state ${\displaystyle s}$ in model ${\displaystyle {\mathcal {M}}}$. Truth depends not only on the structure, but on the current world as well. Just because something is true in one world does not mean it is true in another. To state that a formula ${\displaystyle \varphi }$ is true at a certain world, one writes ${\displaystyle ({\mathcal {M}},s)\models \varphi }$, normally read as "${\displaystyle \varphi }$ is true at ${\displaystyle ({\mathcal {M}},s)}$," or "${\displaystyle ({\mathcal {M}},s)}$ satisfies ${\displaystyle \varphi }$".

It is useful to think of our binary relation ${\displaystyle {\mathcal {K}}_{i}}$ as a possibility relation, because it is meant to capture what worlds or states agent i considers to be possible; In other words, ${\displaystyle w{\mathcal {K}}_{i}v}$ if and only if ${\displaystyle \forall \varphi [(w\models K_{i}\varphi )\implies (v\models \varphi )]}$, and such ${\displaystyle v}$'s are called epistemic alternatives for agent i. In idealized accounts of knowledge (e.g., describing the epistemic status of perfect reasoners with infinite memory capacity), it makes sense for ${\displaystyle {\mathcal {K}}_{i}}$ to be an equivalence relation, since this is the strongest form and is the most appropriate for the greatest number of applications. An equivalence relation is a binary relation that is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive. The accessibility relation does not have to have these qualities; there are certainly other choices possible, such as those used when modeling belief rather than knowledge.

The distribution axiom

This axiom is traditionally known as K. In epistemic terms, it states that if an agent knows ${\displaystyle \varphi }$ and knows that ${\displaystyle \varphi \implies \psi }$, then the agent must also know ${\displaystyle \,\psi }$. So,

${\displaystyle (K_{i}\varphi \land K_{i}(\varphi \implies \psi ))\implies K_{i}\psi }$

This axiom is valid on any frame in relational semantics. This axiom logically establishes modus ponens as a rule of inference for every epistemically possible world.

The knowledge generalization rule

Another property we can derive is that if ${\displaystyle \phi }$ is valid (i.e. a tautology), then ${\displaystyle K_{i}\phi }$. This does not mean that if ${\displaystyle \phi }$ is true, then agent i knows ${\displaystyle \phi }$. What it means is that if ${\displaystyle \phi }$ is true in every world that an agent considers to be a possible world, then the agent must know ${\displaystyle \phi }$ at every possible world. This principle is traditionally called N (Necessitation rule).

${\displaystyle {\text{if }}\models \varphi {\text{ then }}M\models K_{i}\varphi .\,}$

This rule always preserves truth in relational semantics.

The knowledge or truth axiom

This axiom is also known as T. It says that if an agent knows facts, the facts must be true. This has often been taken as the major distinguishing feature between knowledge and belief. We can believe a statement to be true when it is false, but it would be impossible to know a false statement.

${\displaystyle K_{i}\varphi \implies \varphi }$

This axiom can also be expressed in its contraposition as agents cannot know a false statement:

${\displaystyle \varphi \implies \neg K_{i}\neg \varphi }$

This axiom is valid on any reflexive frame.

The positive introspection axiom

This property and the next state that an agent has introspection about its own knowledge, and are traditionally known as 4 and 5, respectively. The Positive Introspection Axiom, also known as the KK Axiom, says specifically that agents know that they know what they know. This axiom may seem less obvious than the ones listed previously, and Timothy Williamson has argued against its inclusion forcefully in his book, Knowledge and Its Limits.

${\displaystyle K_{i}\varphi \implies K_{i}K_{i}\varphi }$

Equivalently, this modal axiom 4 says that agents do not know what they do not know that they know

${\displaystyle \neg K_{i}K_{i}\varphi \implies \neg K_{i}\varphi }$

This axiom is valid on any transitive frame.

The negative introspection axiom

The Negative Introspection Axiom says that agents know that they do not know what they do not know.

${\displaystyle \neg K_{i}\varphi \implies K_{i}\neg K_{i}\varphi }$

Or, equivalently, this modal axiom 5 says that agents know what they do not know that they do not know

${\displaystyle \neg K_{i}\neg K_{i}\varphi \implies K_{i}\varphi }$

This axiom is valid on any Euclidean frame.

Axiom systems

Different modal logics can be derived from taking different subsets of these axioms, and these logics are normally named after the important axioms being employed. However, this is not always the case. KT45, the modal logic that results from the combining of K, T, 4, 5, and the Knowledge Generalization Rule, is primarily known as S5. This is why the properties of knowledge described above are often called the S5 Properties. However, it can be proven that modal axiom B is a theorem in S5 (viz. ${\displaystyle S5\vdash \mathbf {B} }$), which says that what an agent does not know that they do not know is true: ${\displaystyle \neg K_{i}\neg K_{i}\varphi \implies \varphi }$. The modal axiom B is true on any symmetric frame, but is very counterintuitive in epistemic logic: How can the ignorance on one's own ignorance imply truth? It is therefore debatable whether S4 describes epistemic logic better, rather than S5.

Epistemic logic also deals with belief, not just knowledge. The basic modal operator is usually written B instead of K. In this case, though, the knowledge axiom no longer seems right—agents only sometimes believe the truth—so it is usually replaced with the Consistency Axiom, traditionally called D:

${\displaystyle \neg B_{i}\bot }$

which states that the agent does not believe a contradiction, or that which is false. When D replaces T in S5, the resulting system is known as KD45. This results in different properties for ${\displaystyle {\mathcal {K}}_{i}}$ as well. For example, in a system where an agent "believes" something to be true, but it is not actually true, the accessibility relation would be non-reflexive. The logic of belief is called doxastic logic.

Multi-agent systems

When there are multiple agents in the domain of discourse where each agent i corresponds to a separate epistemic modal operator ${\displaystyle K_{i}}$, in addition to the axiom schemata for each individual agent listed above to describe the rationality of each agent, it is usually also assumed that the rationality of each agent is common knowledge.

Examples

The name of the fallacy comes from the example:

• Premise 1: I know who Bob is.
• Premise 2: I do not know who the masked man is
• Conclusion: Therefore, Bob is not the masked man.

The premises may be true and the conclusion false if Bob is the masked man and the speaker does not know that. Thus the argument is a fallacious one.

In symbolic form, the above arguments are

• Premise 1: I know who X is.
• Premise 2: I do not know who Y is.
• Conclusion: Therefore, X is not Y.

Note, however, that this syllogism happens in the reasoning by the speaker "I"; Therefore, in the formal modal logic form, it'll be

• Premise 1: The speaker believes he knows who X is.
• Premise 2: The speaker believes he does not know who Y is.
• Conclusion: Therefore, the speaker believes X is not Y.

Premise 1 ${\displaystyle {\mathcal {B}}_{s}\forall t(t=X\rightarrow K_{s}(t=X))}$ is a very strong one, as it is logically equivalent to ${\displaystyle {\mathcal {B_{s}}}\forall t(\neg K_{s}(t=X)\rightarrow t\not =X)}$. It is very likely that this is a false belief: ${\displaystyle \forall t(\neg K_{s}(t=X)\rightarrow t\not =X)}$ is likely a false proposition, as the ignorance on the proposition ${\displaystyle t=X}$ does not imply the negation of it is true.

Another example:

• Premise 1: Lois Lane thinks Superman can fly.
• Premise 2: Lois Lane thinks Clark Kent cannot fly.
• Conclusion: Therefore, Superman and Clark Kent are not the same person.

Expressed in doxastic logic, the above syllogism is:

• Premise 1: ${\displaystyle {\mathcal {B}}_{\text{Lois}}{\text{Fly}}_{\text{(Superman)}}}$
• Premise 2: ${\displaystyle {\mathcal {B}}_{\text{Lois}}\neg {\text{Fly}}_{\text{(Clark)}}}$
• Conclusion: ${\displaystyle {\text{Superman}}\neq {\text{Clark}}}$

The above reasoning is invalid (not truth-preserving). The valid conclusion to be drawn is ${\displaystyle {\mathcal {B}}_{\text{Lois}}({\text{Superman}}\neq {\text{Clark}})}$.