In mechanism design, implementability is a property of a social choice function. It means that there is an incentive-compatible mechanism that attains ("implements") this function. There are several degrees of implementability, corresponding to the different degrees of incentive-compatibility, e.g:

  • A function is dominant-strategy implementable if it is attainable by a mechanism which is dominant-strategy-incentive-compatible (also called strategyproof).
  • A function is Bayesian-Nash implementable if it is attainable by a mechanism which is Bayesian-Nash-incentive-compatible.

See [1] for a recent reference. In some textbooks, the entire field of mechanism design is called Implementation theory.[2]

References

  1. ↑ "Monotonicity and Implementability". Econometrica. 78 (5): 1749–1772. 2010. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.726.4205. doi:10.3982/ECTA8882. S2CID 1024035.
  2. ↑ Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein: A Course in Game Theory (1994).
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