Political climate

From 1951 to 1966, Ghana was controlled by the Convention People's Party and its founder Kwame Nkrumah. During the 1950s, the CPP sponsored a variety of popular economic projects and in the process created a large foreign debt. In 1960, the CPP moved to nationalize the Ghanaian economy and heavily tightened its control in areas such as currency and taxation. By 1963, the public was suffering from shortages and price gouging. Fewer and fewer businesspeople benefited from party membership. Amidst growing unpopularity, the Party increased its repression of political opponents.^[3] It used the Preventive Detention Act to jail its opponents without trial for up to five years. In 1964, Nkrumah won a heavily rigged referendum that made the CPP the sole legal party, with himself as president for life of both nation and party.^[4] Press freedom reached a low ebb, as evidenced in an October 1965 statement by the Ghanaian Times: "Our socialist society cannot, and would not, tolerate the publication of any newspaper in Ghana which departs from the ideology and loyalties demanded from the press in socialist and Nkrumaist Ghana."^[5] General Afrifa later commented, regarding Radio Ghana: "From early morning till late at night there poured forth a sickening stream of Stalinist adulation and abject flattery. News was so often distorted or suppressed that Ghanaians stopped believing what they heard."^[6]

The Party acted as a political monolith, with functional control over powerful civil organizations such as the Ghana Trades Union Congress and Ghana Muslim Council.^[7] Thus, the CPP had centralized political and economic power in order to pursue rapid industrialization under national control.^[8]

Behind the scenes was an elite group of economic planners which stood to advance its agenda under military rule.^[9] These technocrats within the government found common cause with the military and police in their disdain for the mass politics of the Convention People's Party.^[10] One such figure was B. A. Bentum, former Secretary-General of the Agricultural Workers Union and subsequently the Minister of Forestry under the CPP. Bentum disapproved of the country's socialist tendencies and collaborated with the plotters by supplying them with information (including details about secret Chinese training camps, being used to train revolutionaries from other African countries). Kojo Botsio, chairman of the State Planning Commission, was similarly disposed if not as closely involved.^[11]

Military and police dissatisfaction

Nkrumah faulted the police for allowing an attempted bombing against him in 1962. When on 2 January 1964, a police officer shot at Nkrumah and killed his bodyguard, the Police Force was reorganized from above, eight top officers were dismissed, and the rank and file were disarmed.^[12] Subsequently, in April 1965, the Police Service Act gave Nkrumah direct authority to hire and fire police.^[13] Nkrumah also removed the "Special Branch" intelligence service from the police force and brought it under civilian control.^[12]

Police Commissioner John Harlley and his second-in-command Anthony Deku had long aspired to take control of the government.^[14] Harlley had compiled a large dossier on corruption within the CPP and used these files to gain legitimacy for his cause.^[15] To take over the country, however, the Police Force had to work with the military—not only because they had been disarmed, but also because, as the primary executors of repression and brutality under the CPP, they did not enjoy a good reputation with the general public.^[16]

Coup planners from the military identified mistreatment of the armed forces, and preferential treatment of the President's Own Guard Regiment, as sources of their dissatisfaction.^[17] The salaries of soldiers and officers, set in 1957, had lost much of their value amidst general inflation, and the army did not have money for new uniforms and equipment.^[18]

Some key figures of the coup had come into personal conflict with Nkrumah. Otu, the Chief of Defense Staff, and Ankrah, the Deputy Chief, had been fired in August 1965 and replaced with officers considered more loyal.^[17] The generals later claimed that actions such as these represented an overreach of civilian power over the military.^[19] Afrifa was facing a court-martial for insubordination, to begin on 25 February 1966.^[20] Harlley and Deku were accused of involvement in a newly exposed scheme to illicitly sell diamonds to a European dealer—according to rumour, Nkrumah would have arrested them upon return to the country.^[21][22]

Ethnic loyalties may also have influenced some of the coup planners. A significant number came from the Ewe group, which had been divided by the border with Togo and felt it had received unfair treatment under Nkrumah and the CPP.^[23] The Ewe officers, who formed the inner circle of the coup, all grew up in the same area, and Harlley and Kotoka (the most prominent members from each of the forces) both attended Anloga Presbyterian School.^[24][25]

The coup planners had all received training in Britain, either at Metropolitan Police College or at Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, and were widely perceived as "pro-Western".^[26] In general, the Ghanaian officer corps was deeply Anglophilic and saw British culture as an indicator of status.^[27] Thus, they already objected to Nkrumah's dismissal of British officers in 1961.^[28] Nor were they pleased about an ongoing realignment away from Britain to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for officer training.^[29][30] Air Marshal Otu would write in June 1968 that Ghana "had become a single party totalitarian dictatorship; it had also abregated personal liberties; it had thrown to the winds [the] sacred principle of the rule of law, reduced elections to a farce and much worse, spurned all its traditional ties with the West in favour of dubious advantages of association with strange friends from the east."^[31]

Accusations of Anglo-American involvement

Some of the first allegations about United States involvement in the coup came from retired CIA officer John Stockwell in his 1978 book, In Search of Enemies.^[1][2]

In a footnote comment comparing the coup in Ghana to more recent operations in the Congo, Stockwell wrote:

This is the way the ouster of Nkrumah was handled in Ghana, 1966. The 40 Committee had met and rejected an agency proposal to oust Nkrumah. The Accra station was nevertheless encouraged by headquarters to maintain contact with dissidents of the Ghanaian army for the purpose of gathering intelligence on their activities. It was given a generous budget, and maintained intimate contact with the plotters as a coup was hatched. So close was the station's involvement that it was able to coordinate the recovery of some classified Soviet military equipment by the United States as the coup took place. The station even proposed to headquarters through back channels that a squad be on hand at the moment of the coup to storm the Chinese embassy, kill everyone inside, steal their secret records, and blow up the building to cover the fact. This proposal was quashed, but inside CIA headquarters the Accra station was given full, if unofficial credit for the eventual coup, in which eight Soviet advisors were killed. None of this was adequately reflected in the agency's written records.^[32]

Historian John Prados has written that it has not been verified that the CIA had any role in directing the coup, though they were aware of the tensions which were rising between the Ghana military and the Nkrumah government.^[33] CIA operative Howard Bane even claimed in February 1966 that a string of coups which had occurred in other African nations were also motivating the Ghana military to topple Nkrumah.^[34]

Memoranda released in 2001 suggest that the United States and United Kingdom discussed a plan "to induce a chain reaction eventually leading to Nkrumah's downfall." Relevant files from the British intelligence service, MI6, remain (as of 2009) classified.^[35]

Britain and the United States began discussions of regime change in Ghana in 1961. Details of plans from this time are mostly unknown, since declassified documents from this period remain censored.^[36] One such plot involved Finance Minister K.A. Gbedemah, who secured CIA and State Department support for a plan to overthrow Nkrumah—but was detected by the national intelligence service.^[37]

Central Intelligence Agency interest in Ghana increased again in 1964, when Director of Central Intelligence John A. McCone began participating in high-level meetings to discuss future relations with the country. On 6 February 1964, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk asked McCone to study the possibility of a government takeover led by J.A. Ankrah. McCone indicated on February 11 that such a policy might be pursued in cooperation with the British.^[36] On 26 February 1964, Nkrumah wrote to U.S. President Lyndon Johnson criticizing "two conflicting establishments" operating in Ghana.^[38]

There is the United States Embassy as a diplomatic institution doing formal diplomatic business with us; there is also the C.I.A. organisation which functions presumably within or outside this recognised body. This latter organisation, that is, the C.I.A., seems to devote all its attention to fomenting ill-will, misunderstanding and even clandestine and subversive activities among our people, to the impairment of the good relations which exist between our two Governments.

— Kwame Nkrumah, Letter to President Johnson, 26 February 1964^[39]

When in early 1965 Nkrumah requested financial assistance from the United States, the State Department turned him down and suggested he ask the IMF. Nevertheless, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson did agree to lend him financial aid for the Volta river projects.^[33] The U.S. was reluctant to negotiate with Nkrumah partly because they foresaw a coup d'état led by Otu, Ankrah, and Harlley.^[40][41] In April, the U.S. Embassy in Accra submitted a report to the State Department titled "Proposed United States Aid Posture toward a Successor Government to Nkrumah's."^[42]

A U.S. National Security Council memo from Robert Komer to McGeorge Bundy appraised the situation:^[43]

McGB—

FYI, we may have a pro-Western coup in Ghana soon. Certain key military and police figures have been planning one for some time, and Ghana’s deteriorating economic condition may provide the spark.

The plotters are keeping us briefed, and State thinks we’re more on the inside than the British. While we’re not directly involved (I’m told), we and other Western countries (including France) have been helping to set up the situation by ignoring Nkrumah’s pleas for economic aid. The new OCAM (Francophone) group’s refusal to attend any OAU meeting in Accra (because of Nkrumah’s plotting) will further isolate him. All in all, looks good.

RWK

— Robert W. Komer, Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, 27 May 1965^[44]

Nkrumah himself feared for his life and felt great distress during this time.^[45] Diplomatic relations with the West seemed to deteriorate, with Nkrumah's publication of Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism and his criticism of Britain's response to the secession of White Rhodesia.^[46][47] Nkrumah also resisted economic policies proposed in May 1965 by the International Monetary Fund and reasserted by the World Bank in September 1965.^[48]

Action

Nkrumah left the country on February 21, 1966, for a diplomatic meeting with Ho Chi Minh. He traveled first to China. The United States encouraged him to go on this diplomatic mission and indeed promised to halt the bombing of North Vietnam in order to ensure his safety.^[47]

A group of 600 soldiers stationed in the northern part of the country was ordered to start moving south to Accra, a distance of 435 miles (700 km). They were told at first that they were mobilizing to respond to the situation in Rhodesia.^[49] The coup leaders told the soldiers, when they reached Accra, that Nkrumah was meeting with Ho Chi Minh in preparation for a deployment of Ghanaian soldiers to the Vietnam War. Furthermore, the soldiers were told, they were going to be deployed in Rhodesia to fight against the White government of Ian Smith.^[49]

The soldiers were divided up and led to capture various key government buildings. With the Chief of Defense Staff being at an OAU meeting, the ranking officer was General Charles Barwah, reportedly shot to death when he refused to cooperate with the coup. The State Broadcasting House and international communications buildings were captured quickly. The heaviest fighting broke out at The Flagstaff House, the presidential residence, where the military overthrowers met resistance from the Presidential Guard.^[50]

The coup leaders informed the public of the regime change over the radio at dawn on February 24, 1966.^[51] Colonel Kokota's statement over the radio was as follows:^[52]

Fellow citizens of Ghana, I have come to inform you that the military, in cooperation with the Ghana Police, have taken over the government of Ghana today. The myth surrounding Nkrumah has been broken. Parliament is dissolved and Kwame Nkrumah is dismissed from office. All ministers are also dismissed. The Convention People's Party is disbanded with effect from now. It will be illegal for any person to belong to it.

The soldiers proceeded to arrest CPP ministers as fighting with the Presidential Guard continued. When Colonel Kokota threatened to bomb the presidential residence if resistance continued after 12 PM, Nkrumah's wife Fathia Nkrumah advised the Guards to surrender and they did.^[52]

A CIA telegram informed Washington of the coup, and said, "The coup leaders appear to be implementing the plans they were reported earlier to have agreed on for the immediate post-coup period."^[53] According to the military, 20 members of the presidential guard had been killed and 25 wounded.^[54] Others suggest a death toll of 1,600. According to Nkrumah biographer June Milne, "whatever the death toll, it was far from the 'bloodless coup' reported in the British press."^[47]

Formation of Council

Francis Kwashie, part of the core planning group for the takeover, later commented that he and his comrades lacked "the faintest idea" of how to proceed upon gaining power.^[55] Several participants seemed to believe that the victorious officers would simply handpick acceptable civilian administrators and put them in charge. Marginalizing Nkrumah and other radicals would allow a sort of merger between the Convention People's Party and the opposition United Party, and the work of government could go on.^[56] The group decided that an interim government was necessary and went about determining its membership. Kokota and Harlley, the most obvious candidates for nominal leadership, turned the position down, preferring instead to retain command over their respective forces. Thus, on February 21 (the day Nkrumah left the country; three days before the coup) the group selected J. A. Ankrah, a popular general who suffered involuntary retirement in August 1965.^[57]

The decision to form a ruling council was made on the morning of the coup, at a meeting which included Harlley, Kokota, and Ankrah (but excluded a number of the original group) as well as Emmanuel Noi Omaboe, head of the Central Bureau of Statistics, Supreme Court Justice Fred Kwasi Apaloo, Director of Public Prosecutions Austin N. E. Amissah, and security officer D. S. Quacoopome.^[58] The name of the military government "National Liberation Council" was reportedly proposed by General Kotoka as an alternative to "National Revolutionary Council"—to indicate that the new leaders sought to liberate the country from Nkrumah and the CPP rather than to transform society.^[59]

The council consisted of four soldiers and four police officers.^[60]

• Major Gen. J. A. Ankrah - Chairman of the NLC and Head of State (24 February 1966 – 3 April 1969)
• Mr. J.W.K. Harlley (Inspector General of Police) - Vice Chairman of the NLC
• Lt. Col. Emmanuel K. Kotoka (24 February 1966 – 17 April 1967)
• Brigadier Akwasi Amankwaa Afrifa
• Mr. B. A. Yakubu (Deputy Commissioner of Police)
• Col. Albert Kwesi Ocran
• Mr. Anthony K. Deku (Commissioner of Police, CID)
• Mr. J. E. O. Nunoo (Commissioner of Police, Administration)

With this membership, the Council displayed more ethnic diversity than did the core group of coup planners. Two members, Nunoo and Yakubu, had no advance knowledge of the coup at all.^[61]

Immediate political changes and continuities

Three committees—the Economic Committee, the Administrative Committee, and the Publicity Committee—manifested on the day of the coup as organs of government. The Economic Committee, in particular, was composed of high-ranking members of the pre-existing civil service and played the lead role in creating the policies of the new government.^[62] The coup leaders and the "technocrats" of the civil service shared the view that politics and politicians needed to be set aside in order to set up a more effective government apparatus. The military and police, lacking knowledge of economics and governance, relied on the civil service to concoct and engineer the necessary changes.^[63]

The first Proclamation of the new government, issued two days after the coup, suspended Ghana's 1960 Constitution, dismissed Nkrumah, dissolved the National Assembly and the Convention Peoples' Party, and named Ankrah as chairman and Harlley as deputy chairman.^[64] Next, the Council declared its intention to restore civilian government "as soon as possible" and its plan for separation of powers between executive, legislative, and judicial branches.^[65] The Council decreed that the judicial system would continue along the same model, but judges were asked to take new oaths in which they agreed to abide by government decrees.^[66] (In practice, military commissions would take authority over judicial functions of political importance.)^[67]

The new government made membership in the Convention People's Party illegal and took hundreds of people into "protective custody". These included former members of parliament and district commissioners, as well as 446 people affiliated directly with Nkrumah—including his financial advisor and his driver.^[68] Leaders of the Ghana Muslim Council were dismissed on the grounds of their party loyalties.^[7] Formation of new political parties was banned.^[69] Commissioners were established to investigate corruption in the previous regime and to organize the continued suppression of the CPP.^[70]

The NLC disbanded and confiscated the assets of eight Nkrumaist organizations, including the United Ghana Farmers' Co-operative Council, the National Council of Ghana Women and the Ghana Youth Pioneers.^[71] Boy Scouts and Girl Guides groups were introduced to replace the latter.^[72]

Once the CPP was no longer seen as a political threat, the new government indicated that it would not retaliate excessively against officials from the old regime.^[71] All but twenty of the hundreds of imprisoned Nkrumaists were free by 1968.^[73] And although the system of ministries was re-arranged, the membership and hierarchy of the civil service remained mostly intact, and in fact gained power after the coup.^[74]

B. A. Bentum (verily a CPP minister himself) was appointed Secretary-General of the Trades Union Congress and authorized to cull its old CPP leadership. Bentum dissociated the Trades Union Congress from the All-African Trade Union Federation, began a "Productivity Drive" to raise output, helped the government with public relations abroad, and created a mechanism for supplying civilian workers to assist the armed forces.^[75]

Popular support

Public demonstrations were held in support of the new government, especially by public organizations in Accra. Nkrumah, in China, claimed that the military had orchestrated these demonstrations.^[76] In part because Nigeria's military had accomplished a coup of its own in January 1966, regime change in Ghana did not come as a complete shock.^[77] Under new leadership, groups like the Trades Union Congress and the Ghana Young Pioneers (shortly before they were disbanded) celebrated the coup and renounced Nkrumaist socialism.^[78] On March 4, top Nkrumah aide Emmanuel Ayeh-Kumi publicly accused the former President of corruption. Other party leaders followed suit.^[79] The government released more than 800 prisoners from the previous regime.^[80]

By June 1966, spokesmen for the new government began to qualify their statements on the restoration of civilian government, saying more time was needed "to establish an effective machinery of government" and for people "to readjust to the new situation".^[81] Rule by the National Liberation Council was sustained by strong support from the intelligentsia, in the civil service and at university, as well as by the military and police forces themselves.^[82]

Diplomatic realignment

Diplomatic relations with Russia, China, and Cuba were ceased, their embassies closed, and their technicians ejected.^[83] Ghana withdrew its embassies from these countries, from Hanoi in North Vietnam, and from five countries in Eastern Europe.^[84]

From the West, the coup was immediately rewarded by food aid and a relaxation of the policies designed to isolate Ghana. World cocoa prices began to increase.^[85] Relations with Britain, which had been suspended over the Rhodesia issue, were restored.^[84]

Robert Komer of the National Security Council wrote to Lyndon Johnson,^[86]

The coup in Ghana is another example of a fortuitous windfall. Nkrumah was doing more to undermine our interests than any other black African. In reaction to his strongly pro-Communist leanings, the new military regime is almost pathetically pro-Western. The point of this memo is that we ought to follow through skillfully and consolidate such successes. A few thousand tons of surplus wheat or rice, given now when the new regimes are quite uncertain as to their future relations with us, could have a psychological significance out of all proportion to the cost of the gesture. I am not arguing for lavish gifts to these regimes—indeed, giving them a little only whets their appetites, and enables us to use the prospect of more as leverage.

— Robert W. Komer, Memorandum to President Johnson, 12 March 1966^[87]

Leaders in the new regime, as well as observers in business and the press, declared Ghana open for business with Western multinationals.^[88] Representatives from the IMF and the World Bank arrived in Accra in March 1966, quickly establishing a plan for "very close collaboration".^[89]

Budget

One declaration in March 1966 exempted members of the military from paying taxes, restored their pension plan, and entitled them to various public amenities.^[90][91] Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police personnel received cash bonuses of undisclosed size.^[92]

Between 1966 and 1969, military spending doubled, from NȻ 25.5 million to NȻ54.2 million.^[93]

Status

The military borrowed techniques from the British to upgrade the social status of the armed forces; for example, they used publicity in magazines to create an image of the soldier as a powerful, humane, elite member of society.^[27] These policies dramatically increased Ghanaians' interest in military careers.^[94]

The coup plotters from within the armed forces all promoted themselves to higher ranks and eventually all had become some sort of General.^[95] The preferred philosopher of this group was Plato, whose Republic offers the slogan: "The punishment which the wise suffer who refuse to take part in the Government is to live under the Government of worse men."^[96]

Britain turned down the new government's request for military uniforms, but the United States was willing to supply some, and thus U.S. Army uniforms were worn by the Ghanaian Army.^[97]

Counter-coup

Junior officers attempted an unsuccessful coup on 17 April 1967. The three leaders of this counter-coup were young officers from the Akan ethnic group. With a force of 120 men, they succeeded in capturing the State Broadcasting House and the former president's house, into which General Kokota had moved. General Kokota died in the fighting, and Lt.-Gen Ankrah escaped by climbing over a wall and jumping into the ocean. The rebel officers laid siege to the military headquarters and announced themselves over state radio. However, the plotters were outmaneuvered at a conference held to determine plans for the new government, and subsequently captured.^[98]

The counter-coup was widely believed to be motivated by divisions between the southwestern (Akan, Ashanti, Fanti) ethnic groups and the southeastern (Ga, Ewe) ethnic groups—so much so that the military issued an official statement denying it.^[99]

Three hundred soldiers and six hundred civilians were jailed in retaliation.^[73] On May 26, 1967, two officers convicted of treason became the subjects of Ghana's first public execution.^[100] Fearing future actions from within the military, the NLC decommissioned eight senior officers and reappointed some of its own members to command positions.^[101] Air Marshal Michael Otu was accused of subversion in November 1968.^[102]

Regional Administration Chairmen (Regional Ministers)

Principal Secretaries to the Ministries

^[115]

Whereas the Convention People's Party had claimed legitimacy from its status as a mass party, the new regime increased the role of intermediate groups to interact with the public at large.^[116] Many of these groups, including religious, legal, and economic organizations established before the CPP, had opposed the one-party system and found they could work effectively with the military government.^[117]

Chiefs such as the powerful Asantehene approved of the regime change, which they saw as restoring their power after years of African socialism.^[118] The NLC "destooled" at least 176 chiefs appointed during the Nkrumah era.^[119] To the dismay of tenant farmers, the NLC granted the chiefs' collective request for more favorable economic policies such as an end to the cap on land rent.^[120]

In November 1968 the government established a Constituent Assembly, which contained representatives from 91 organizations such as the House of Chiefs, the Ghana Midwives' Association, and the National Catholic Secretariat.^[121]

The NLC integrated government intelligence gathering with military and police forces, thereby increasing the effectiveness of both.^[122]

Civil liberties

Austerity and unemployment led to unrest and crime, which the government met with repression by police and military forces.^[123] In January 1967, the NLC authorized the use of military tribunals for civilians accused of subversion.^[100]

The country's two largest daily papers, the Daily Graphic and the Ghanaian Times, remained state-owned. These newspapers readily changed their allegiance from the Nkrumah government to the National Liberation Council.^[124] Other newspapers, such as the Legon Observer published at the University of Ghana, were more critical of the regime.

In general, the press was allowed limited criticism of government policies, but were sufficiently intimidated that they did not question the legitimacy of the government itself, nor advocate for an alternative regime.^[125] Early words about "freedom of the press" were somewhat undermined by caveats and retaliatory actions. The "Prohibition of Rumour Decree" issued in October 1966 authorized 28 days of detention and up to three years in prison for journalists who might "cause alarm and despondency", "disturb the public peace", or "cause disaffection against the N.L.C."^[126] Criticism of the 1967 arrangement between the American firm Abbott Laboratories with the State Pharmaceutical Corporation led the NLC to fire four editors from the nation's three leading newspapers.^[127]

Books including Nkrumah's Dark Days in Ghana were allowed into the country.^[128]

Complaints about immigration and foreign business activity led to a rule published in 1968 which starting on July 1, 1968, barred non-Ghanaians from operating retail and small wholesale businesses, driving taxis, or running other small businesses with fewer than 30 workers. Another decree restricted where non-Ghanaians could live.^[129]

Privatization and multinational business

1 New Cedi (NȻ) note

The NLC promised "structural changes" of state corporations, some of which were fully privatized. The Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation, created in September 1967, became owner of 19 such corporations.^[134] Control over large production sectors was granted to foreign multinational corporations such as Norway Cement Export and Abbott Laboratories.^[135] These ventures held extremely low risk for the foreign companies, since they relied on capital already within Ghana, enjoyed various economic privileges, and had outside backing to prevent expropriation.^[136]

Under guidance of the International Monetary Fund, the government in 1967 devalued the Ghanaian Cedi (formerly the Ghanaian pound) by 30% relative to the United States dollar. The rationale for this policy was that if other countries could buy Ghanaian goods at lower prices, exports would increase, and conversely imports would decrease. In fact, the opposite results occurred. Exports of all commodities except wood and diamonds decreased. Imports increased by a larger factor.^[137]

Various state-run development projects were abandoned, including some which were nearly complete. These included manufacturing and refining operations under state control which would have competed with foreign business interests.^[138] A plan to stockpile cocoa (the top export at the time) in order to take improve Ghana's position in the world market, was canceled; the nearly-built silos, intended to accomplish this goal, allowed to fall into disrepair.^[139] Agricultural projects were privatized or canceled and newly purchased equipment left in fields to rust.^[140] Overall spending on agriculture decreased by 35%.^[141] A fleet of fishing boats were grounded to lie idle and deteriorating—leading the country to begin importing foreign fish.^[142] Much of the capital and property obtained by the state from 1957 to 1966 now fell into the hands of the private sector.^[143]

Labour and quality of life

Under the National Liberation Council, inflation decreased, production went up, and wages rose. The minimum wage increased from 0.65 cedi to 0.70 cedi in 1967 and 0.75 cedi in 1968. However, fewer people had jobs—and even for those who did, higher costs of living offset some of the wage increases.^[144] Food prices increased dramatically due to the collapse of state-run agriculture and withdrawal of credit to independent farmers.^[145] In the public sector, minimum wage rose from Ȼ0.70 to Ȼ0.75, with future increases capped at 5%, while top wages increased by much more.^[141] Judges, high-ranking civil servants, and university professors received job benefits and raises.^[146]

Most of the profits from higher productivity went to business owners and foreign investors, and society became more economically stratified.^[144]

The new regime made some initial concessions to workers, such as an increase in the threshold of taxable income, and a decrease in taxes (and thus prices) of some basic goods. The goodwill generated by these initial policies faded when 38,000 people lost their jobs in July–October 1966 and requests for a NȻ1/day basic wage were soundly rejected. Strikes were illegal and in February 1967 incitement to general strike became a crime punishable by 25+ years in prison, or by death. The Trades Union Congress, under the leadership of B. A. Bentum (the chief civilian collaborator in the 1966 coup), made efforts to prevent these strikes from happening, and was therefore widely distrusted by workers.^[147]

Workers in Ghana went on strike 58 times from 1966 to 1967, 38 times in 1968, and 51 times in 1969. Strikers were fired and sometimes fired upon.^[148] The latter happened at a gold mine in Obuasi in March 1969.^[149] By August 1968, 66,000 workers (representing 10% of the national workforce and 36% of the Accra workforce) had lost their jobs.^[150]

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