Mediterranean rivalries

In the 16th century, control of the western Mediterranean was contested between the Spaniards and the Turks. Both were confident due to recent triumphs and subsequent expansion. In 1492, Spain completed her centuries-long Reconquista of the Iberian Peninsula, followed by the first Spanish settlements in America. Spain then formulated an African policy: a series of presidios in port cities along the African coast.^[4][5] The Ottoman Turks had fulfilled their long-term ambition of capturing Constantinople in 1453, then successfully invaded further into the Balkans (1459–1482), and later conquered Syria and Egypt (1516–1517).

Turkish Barbary corsairs became active from bases in the Maghreb.^[6][7] Spain captured and occupied several ports in North Africa, including Mers-el-Kebir (1505), Oran (1509), Tripoli (1510), and Bougie (1510). Spain also established treaty relations with a half dozen others. These agreements included Algiers (1510), which provided Spanish occupation of the off-shore island Peñón de Argel. Spain also reached agreements with Tlemcen (1511), a city about 40 km. Inland and with Tunis, whose Spanish alliance lasted on and off for decades. Near Tunis, the port of Goletta was later occupied by Spanish forces, who built a large and strong presidio there. They also constructed an aqueduct to Tunis for use by the kasbah.^{[8][9][10][11]}

Aruj (c.1474–1518), the elder Barbarossa

The Hafsid dynasty had since 1227 ruled Tunisia, enjoying prestige when it was the leading state of the Maghreb or barely surviving in ill-favored times. Extensive trade with European merchants continued over some centuries, an activity that led to state treaties. However, the Hafsids also harbored corsairs who raided merchant shipping. During the 15th century, the Hafsids employed a Christian force of hundreds, nearly all Catalans, as bodyguards. In the 16th century, the Hafsid rule grew weak, often limited to Tunis. The last three Hafsid sultans, al-Hasan, his son Ahmad, and his brother Muhammad made inconsistent treaties with Spain.^[12][13][14]

The cross-cultural Hafsid alliance with Spain was not as unusual as it might seem, given the many Muslim-Christian treaties, despite recurrent hostilities.^[15][16][17] Indeed, during the early 16th century, France allied with the Ottomans against the Spanish Emperor Charles V.^[18][19] As an indirect result of Spain's African policy, a few Muslim rulers encouraged Turkish forces to enter the region to counter the Spanish presence. The Hafsid rulers of Tunis came to see the Turks and their corsair allies as a greater threat and entered an alliance with the Spanish,^[20] as also did the Sa'dids of Morocco.^[21][22] Nonetheless, many Maghrebi Muslims strongly preferred Islamic rule, and the Hafsid's decades-long Spanish alliance was not generally popular and was indeed anathema to some.^[23][24] On the other hand, the Saadi dynasty sultans of Morocco successfully played off Iberian against Turk, thus remaining both Muslim-ruled and independent of the Ottoman grasp.^[25][26]

The Ottoman Empire from 1299 to 1683, the year of their second Siege of Vienna

In this naval struggle, the Ottoman Empire supported many Barbary pirates, who raided European commercial shipping in the Mediterranean.^[27] The corsairs later would make Algiers their principal base. The "architects of Ottoman rule in the Maghrib" were Aruj (c.1474–1518) and his younger brother Khayr al-Din (c.1483–1546).^[28][29] Both were called Barbarossa ("red beard"). The Muslim brothers hailed from obscure origins in the Greek island of Medelli or Mytilene [ancient Lesbos].^[30][31][32]

After acquiring fighting experience in the eastern Mediterranean (during which Aruj was captured and spent three years at oars in a galley of the Knights of St. John before being ransomed),^[33] the two brothers arrived in Tunis as corsair leaders. By 1504 they had entered into a privateer agreement with the Hafsid sultan Mohammad b. al-Hasan (1493–1526). Under the agreement, the 'prizes' (ships, cargoes, and captives) were to be shared. The brothers operated from Goletta [Halq al Wadi]; they ran similar operations from Djerba in the south, where Aruj was governor. During these years in Spain, those who remained non-Christian were required to leave, including Muslims; at times, Aruj employed his ships to transport many Moorish Andalucians to North Africa, especially Tunisia. For these efforts, Aruj won praise and many Muslim recruits.^{[32][34][35][36]} Twice, Aruj joined the Hafsids in unsuccessful assaults on Bougie, held by Spain. Then the brothers set up an independent base in Djidjelli, east of Bougie, which attracted Hafsid hostility.^[28]

Khayr al-Din (Hayreddin) Pasha (c.1483–1546), the younger Barbarossa

In 1516 Aruj and his brother Khayr al-Din, accompanied by Turkish soldiers, moved further west to Algiers, where he wrestled control away from the shaykh of the Tha'aliba tribe, who had entered into a treaty with Spain. By political cunning, in which the tribal chief and later 22 notables were killed, control of Algiers passed to the Barbarossa brothers. The Turkish brothers were already Ottoman allies.^[37] In 1518, when Aruj led an attack against Tlemcen, then held by a Spanish ally (since 1511), Aruj was killed by Muslim tribal forces and the Spanish.^[38][39]

His younger brother Khayr al-Din inherited control of Algiers but left that city for some years and was based to its east. After returning to Algiers in 1529, he captured from Spain the offshore island Peñón de Argel whose guns had controlled the port; by constructing a causeway joining these islands, he created an excellent harbor for the city.^[40] Khayr al-Din continued to direct large-scale raids on Christian shipping and against the coastlands of Mediterranean Europe, seizing much wealth and taking many captives. He won several naval battles and became a celebrity. In 1533 Khayr al-Din was called to Constantinople, where the Ottoman sultan made him Pasha and the Turkish navy admiral [Kapudan-i Derya];^[41] he acquired control over many more ships and soldiers. In 1534 Khayr al-Din, "taking advantage of a revolt against the Hafsid al-Hasan," invaded by sea and captured the city of Tunis from Spain's allies.^[42]

The march on Tunis in 1569 by Uluç Ali: 5,000 janissaries, with Kabyle troops

The following year Emperor Charles V (r.1516–1556) he organized a fleet under Andrea Doria of Genoa, composed predominantly of Italians, Germans, and Spaniards, which recaptured Tunis in 1535, following which the Hafsid sultan Mawlay Hasan was reinstated. ^[43][44][45] However, Khayr al-Din escaped.^[46] After that, as supreme commander of Ottoman naval forces for the Ottoman Empire, Khayr al-Din was largely preoccupied with affairs outside the Maghrib.^[47]

Establishment of Ottoman rule

The Capture of Tunis by Uluj Ali, 1574^[48]

A few decades passed until, in 1556, another Turkish corsair Dragut (Turgut), ruling in Tripoli, attacked Tunisia from the east, entering Kairouan in 1558.^[49] In 1569, Uluj Ali Pasha, a renegade corsair,^[50][51][52] Now the successor to Khayr al-Din as the Beylerbey of Algiers advanced with Turkish forces from the west and seized the Spanish presidio Goletta and the Hafsid capital, Tunis.^[53][54] After the key naval victory of the Christian armada at Lepanto in 1571,^[55] In 1573, Don Juan de Austria retook Tunis for Spain, restoring Hafsid's rule.^[56] A large Ottoman expedition returned in 1574 under the command of Sinan Pasha and captured Tunis permanently. The last ruler of the Hafsid dynasty was then sent by ship to the Ottoman sultan, imprisoned.^[57][58]

Absent the entry of the Turks into the western Mediterranean, the political situation favored the Christian north. In overall strength, the various European powers led by Spain continued to increase their lead. Among the local Maghrebi states, business was in decline and their governments were weak and divided. The long-term future seemed to present the possibility, or probability, of an eventual 'reconquest' of North Africa from the north. Accordingly, the intervention by another rising foreign power, co-religionists from the east, namely the well-armed Ottoman Turks, appeared crucial. It tipped the scales in the Maghreb, allowing for several centuries of continued rule by the older Muslim institutions, as redone by the Turks. Furthermore, the successful but questionable tactic of corsairs raiding European commercial shipping fit well enough into the Mediterranean strategy pursued by the Ottoman Porte at Constantinople.^[59][60][61]

"Turkey was frequently combated by native North African rulers and never gained any hold over Morocco. But the Turks were nonetheless a powerful ally for Barbary, diverting Christian energies into eastern Europe, threatening Mediterranean communications, and absorbing those forces which might otherwise have turned their attention to reconquest in Africa."^[62]

So for the first time, the Ottomans entered the Maghrib, eventually establishing their governing authority, at least indirectly, along most of the southern coast of the Mediterranean. During the 16th and subsequent centuries, their empire was widely recognized as the leading Muslim state in the world: Islam's primary focus. The Ottoman Empire was "the leader of all Islam for nearly half a millennium." The Turkish sultan became the caliph.^[63]

The Spanish-Ottoman truce of 1581 quieted the Mediterranean rivalry between these two world powers. Spain kept a few of its Maghrebi presidios and ports (e.g., Melilla and Oran).^[64][65] Both the Spanish and Ottoman Empires had become preoccupied elsewhere.^[66] The Ottomans would claim suzerainty over Tunisia for the next three centuries; however, its effective political control in the Maghreb would be short.

Ottoman pashas

Map of Ottoman Tunisia

After Tunisia fell to the Ottoman Empire, the Porte appointed a pasha to govern. "Pasha" (Turkish: paşa, lit. 'head, chief') was an Ottoman imperial title designating a high office, a holder of civil or military authority, such as the governor of a province.^[67][68] When Uluj Ali, the beylerybey of Algiers, died in 1587, the Ottoman sultan discontinued the office, in effect normalizing the administration of the Maghrebi provinces in acknowledgment of an end to the long struggle with Spain. In its place, for each province (present-day Algeria, Libya, Tunisia),^[69] the office of pasha was established to oversee the provincial government.^[70][71]

Thus in 1587, a pasha became the Ottoman governor of Tunisia. Under the Pasha served a bey, among whose duties was the collection of state revenue. From 1574 to 1591, a council (the Diwan), composed of senior Turkish military (Trk: buluk-bashis) and local notables, advised the Pasha. The language used remained Turkish. With permanent Ottoman rule (imposed in 1574), the government of Tunis acquired some stability. In the prior period, they had been made insecure and uncertain by the fortunes of war.^[72][73][74]

However, the new Ottoman Pasha's grip on power in Tunisia was of short duration. Four years later, in 1591, a revolt within the ranks of the occupying Turkish forces (the janissaries) thrust forward a new military commander, the Dey, who effectively took the pasha's place and became the ruling authority in Tunis. The pasha remained a lesser figure, who nonetheless continued to be appointed from time to time by the Ottoman Porte.^[75] Within a few decades, however, the bey of Tunis added to his office the title of pasha; soon after that, the bey's growing power began to eclipse that of the day. Eventually, the bey of Tunis became the sole ruling authority. The beys of Tunis always kept well apart from any Ottoman attempts to compromise their political grip on power. The deys as Muslim rulers were also dignified by the honor and prestige associated with the title of pasha, directly connected to the Ottoman Caliph, whose religious significance included being the 'Commander of the Faithful' (Arb: Amīr al-Mu'minīn).^[76][77][78]

Janissary Deys

Until 1591, the corps of janissaries in Tunisia was considered to be under the control of the local Ottoman Pasha. In 1591 janissary junior officers (deys) overthrew their senior officers, forcing the Pasha to acknowledge the authority of one of their men. This new leader was called the Dey, elected by his fellow deys. The Dey took charge of law and order in the capital and military affairs, thus becoming "the virtual ruler of the country." The change defied the Ottoman Empire, although, from the Tunisian perspective, political power remained under the control of foreigners. The existing state diwan (council) was dismissed, but to appease local opinion, some Tunisian Maliki jurists were appointed to some key positions (yet the Ottoman Hanafi jurists still predominated). The janissary Dey enjoyed broad discretion, being relatively free to exercise his authority, yet his reach was initially limited to Tunis and other cities.^[79]

Two very effective Deys were 'Uthman Dey (1598–1610) and his son-in-law Yusuf Dey (r. 1610–1637). Able administrators displayed tact, enhancing the dignity of the office. Neither being fond of luxury, treasury funds were made available for public projects and new construction (e.g., a mosque, fortress, barracks, and repair of aqueducts). Rebellious tribes were subdued. An extended period of chronic social turbulence in Tunisia was brought to a close. The resulting peace and order allowed for some measure of prosperity. The Dey's ruling authority was supported by and relied upon the Qaptan of the Corsair fleet and the Bey, who collected taxes.^[80]

However, under Yusuf Dey, various interest groups emerged and maneuvered to outflank his ruling strategies. Many such were Tunisian, e.g., the local military, the urban notables including the disbanded diwan, and most rural tribes; at least to some extent, the distant sultan in Constantinople was included. During the 1620s and 1630s, the local Turkish Bey managed to enlist these social forces, thus augmenting his authority and coming to rival the Dey, then overtaking him. That the political reign of the Dey and his janissaries had slowly evaporated was demonstrated when in an attempt to regain power, their uprising of 1673 failed.^[81][82][83]

Muradid Beys

The Bey (Turkish: gazi commander) in Tunisia was the leading officer who "supervised the internal administration and the collection of taxes." In particular, the Bey's duties included controlling and collecting taxes in the tribal, rural areas. Twice a year, armed expeditions (mahallas) patrolled the countryside, showing the arm of the central authority. For this purpose, the Bey had organized, as an auxiliary force, rural cavalry (sipahis), mostly Arab, recruited from what came to be called "government" (makhzan) tribes.^[84][85][86]

Ramadan Bey had sponsored a Corsican named Murad Curso since his youth.^[87] After Ramadan died in 1613, Murad followed his benefactor into the office of Bey, which he exercised effectively (1613–1631). Eventually, he was also named Pasha, by then a ceremonial post, yet his position as Bey remained inferior to the Dey. His son Hamuda Bey (r.1631–1666), with the support of the local notables of Tunis, acquired both titles, that of Pasha and that of Bey. Under his title as Pasha, the Bey enjoyed the social prestige of connection with the Sultan-Caliph in Constantinople. In 1640, at the death of the Dey, Hamuda Bey maneuvered to establish his control over appointments to that office. Consequently, the Bey then became the supreme ruler in Tunisia.

Under Murad II Bey (reigned 1666–1675), son of Hamuda, the Diwan again functioned as a council of notables. In 1673, the Janissary days rose in revolt, seeing their power ebbing. During the consequent fighting, the janissaries and urban forces commanded by the days fought against the Muradid Beys, supported by largely rural parties under tribal shaykhs and with widespread support from city notables. As the Beys secured victory, so did the rural Bedouin leaders and the Tunisian stars, who also emerged triumphant—the Arabic language returned to local official use. However, the Muradids continued to use Turkish in the central government, accentuating their elite status and Ottoman connection.

At Murad II Bey's death, internal discord within the Muradid family led to an armed struggle, known as the Revolutions of Tunis or the Muradid War of Succession (1675-1705). The Turkish rulers of Algeria later intervened on behalf of one side in this struggle born of domestic conflict; these Algerian forces remained after the fighting slowed, which proved unpopular. Tunisia's unfortunate condition of civil discord and Algerian interference persisted. The last Muradid Bey was assassinated in 1702 by Ibrahim Sharif, who then ruled for several years with Algerian backing.^[88][89][90] Hence, the dynasty of the Muradid Beys may be dated from 1640 to 1702.

A gradual economic shift occurred during the Muradid era (c. the 1630s–1702), as corsair raiding decreased due to European pressure. Commercial trading based on agricultural products (chiefly grains) increased due to an integration of the rural population into regional networks. Mediterranean trade, however, continued to be carried by European shipping companies. To derive the maximum advantage from the export trade, the Beys instituted government monopolies that mediated between the local producers and foreign merchants. As a result, the rulers and their business partners (drawn from foreign-dominated elites well-connected to the Turkish-speaking ruling caste) took a disproportionate share of Tunisia's trading profits.^[91] This precluded the development of local business interests, whether rural landowners or wealthy merchant strata. The social divide persisted, with the important families in Tunisia identified as a "Turkish" ruling caste.^[92]

Husainid Beys

After 1705, the office of the Bey was held by the Husaynid dynasty, which effectively ruled Tunisia as a hereditary monarchy from 1705 to 1881.^[93] Formally, the beys of Tunis remained vassals of the Ottoman Empire until the 19th century, but they could act with a large degree of independence and often conducted their own foreign affairs.^{[1]: 230, 271–275, 305}

The dynastic founder, Husayn ibn Ali (r. 1705–1735), an Ottoman cavalry officer (agha of the spahis) of Cretan origin, managed to acquire the sovereign power in 1705. His military units were included in those Tunisian forces that fought and defeated the then Algerian invasion. The Turkish janissary then selected their own Dey as the new ruler. Husayn ibn Ali, however, opposed the Dey and sought the backing of Tunisian khassa (notables), the ulama and the religious, as well as local tribes. Thus, though also a Turkish-speaking foreigner, he worked to obtain native loyalties against the Turkish soldiery and eventually prevailed. Accordingly, as ruler he sought to be perceived as a popular Muslim interested in local issues and prosperity. He appointed as qadi a Tunisian Maliki jurist, instead of an Hanafi preferred by the Ottomans. He also restricted the legal prerogatives of the janissary and the Dey. Under Husayn b. Ali as Bey of Tunis support was provided to agriculture, especially planting olive orchards. Public works were undertaken, e.g., mosques and madrassa (schools). His popularity was demonstrated in 1715 when the kapudan-pasha of the Ottoman fleet sailed to Tunis with a new governor to replace him; instead Husayn Bey summoned council, composed of local civil and military leaders, who backed him against the Ottoman Empire, which then acquiesced.^[94]

In 1735 a succession dispute erupted between his nephew Ali (r. 1735–1755) and his son Muhammad (r. 1755–1759) who challenged his cousin. A divisive civil war was fought; it ended in 1740 with Ali's uncertain victory. This result was reversed in 1756 after ten more years of fighting, but not without further meddling by Algeria.^[95]

Early Husaynid policy required a careful balance among several divergent parties: the distant Ottomans, the Turkish-speaking elite in Tunisia, and local Tunisians (both urban and rural, notables and clerics, landowners and remote tribal leaders). Entanglement with the Ottoman Empire was avoided due to its potential ability to absorb the Bey's prerogatives; yet religious ties to the Ottoman Caliph were fostered, which increased the prestige of the Beys and helped in winning approval of the local ulama and deference from the notables. Janissaries were still recruited, but increasing reliance was placed on tribal forces. Turkish was spoken at the apex, but use of Arabic increased in government use. Kouloughlis (children of mixed Turkish and Tunisian parentage) and native Tunisians notables were given increased admittance into higher positions and deliberations. The Husaynid Beys, however, did not themselves intermarry with Tunisians; instead they often turned to the institution of mamluks for marriage partners. Mamluks also served in elite positions.^[96] The dynasty never ceased to identify as Ottoman, and thereby privileged. Nonetheless, the local ulama were courted, with funding for religious education and the clerics. Local jurists (Maliki) entered government service. Marabouts of the rural faithful were mollified. Tribal shaykhs were recognized and invited to conferences. Especially favored at the top were a handful of prominent families, Turkish-speaking, who were given business and land opportunities, as well as important posts in the government, depending on their loyalty.^[97][98]

The French Revolution and reactions to it negatively affected European economic activity leading to shortages which provided business opportunities for Tunisia, i.e., regarding goods in high demand but short in supply, the result might be handsome profits. The capable and well-regarded Hammouda Pasha (r. 1782–1813) was Bey of Tunis (the fifth) during this period of prosperity; he also turned back an Algerian invasion in 1807, and quelled a janissary revolt in 1811.^[99]

After the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Britain and France secured the Bey's agreement to cease sponsoring or permitting corsair raids, which had resumed during the Napoleonic conflict. After a brief resumption of raids, it stopped.^[100] In the 1820s economic activity in Tunisia took a steep downturn. The Tunisian government was particularly affected due to its monopoly positions regarding many exports. Credit was obtained to weather the deficits, but eventually the debt would grow to unmanageable levels. Tunisia had sought to bring up to date its commerce and trade. Yet different foreign business interests began to increasingly exercised control over domestic markets; imports of European manufactures often changed consumer pricing which could impact harshly on the livelihood of Tunisian artisans, whose goods did not fare well in the new environment. Foreign trade proved to be a means by which European influence became entrenched.^[101][102]

Establishment of French colonial rule

In 1881 the French invaded Tunisia, using a border skirmish as a pretext.^{[1]: 326–327} With the signing of the Treaty of Bardo later that year, a French protectorate was imposed over the country, lasting until 1956. The Ottoman sultan officially rejected the Bardo Treaty, but made no attempt to stop the French takeover.^[103] During this period of colonial rule, the beylical institution was retained; the Husaynid Bey served as titular head of state but it was the French who actually ruled the country. After achieving its full independence, Tunisia declared itself a republic in 1957; the beylical office was terminated and the Husaynid dynasty came to an end.^[104][105]

Janissaries

A Janissary (15th century), from a drawing by Gentile Bellini of Venice

The Ottomans first garrisoned Tunis with 4,000 janissaries taken from their occupying forces in Algiers; the troops were primarily Turkish, recruited from Anatolia. Janissary corps were under the immediate command of their Agha (Trk: "master"). The junior officers were called deys (Trk: "maternal uncle"); each commanded about 100 soldiers. The Ottoman Porte did not after that maintain the ranks of the janissaries in Tunis, but it appointed pasha for Tunisia himself to begin to recruit them from different regions.^[122][123] The janissaries (yeni-cheri or "new troops") were an elite institution peculiar to the Ottoman state, though deriving from earlier practice.^[124] Christian youth recruited through a practice called devshirme [Trk: "to collect"], often from Greece and the Balkans, were impressed into military training and compelled to convert to Islam; when mature, they provided an elite corps of soldiery. Kept apart in their barracks and forbidden marriage, they were under a strict code of toilet and dress and regimented by rules of the Hurufi sect (later the Bektashi Sufi).^[125] Begun in the 15th century as a type of slavery, the janissaries later came to enjoy privileges and could rise to high positions. A well-known symbol of their collective force was the huge Kazan [Trk: "kettle"], beside which they ate and talked business. Eventually, Muslims became members; the janissaries gained the right to marry and evolved into a powerful caste. They were then liable to riot and loot if not appeased, and "not less than six Sultans were either dethroned or murdered through their agency." At first, a small elite of 10,000, by the 19th century, when the institution was terminated, "the number on the [Ottoman] payroll had reached... over 130,000."^[126]

In the Maghreb, under Ottoman control, the janissaries were originally Turkish or Turkish-speaking. Some rivalry existed between the janissaries and the pirates, composed mainly of Christian renegades. Also, the janissaries were viewed with suspicion as potential enemy combatants, the local tribal forces, and the Maghreb militias. Called collectively the ojaq [Trk: "hearth"], the janissary corps maintained high unity and élan.^[127][128]

"They possessed a high sense of group solidarity and egalitarian spirit in the ranks, and elected their commander-in-chief, the agha, and a diwan [council] which protected their group interests. Being Turkish, they enjoyed a privileged position in the state: they were not subject to the regular system of justice in the regency and were entitled to rations of bread, meat, and oil, to a regular salary, and a proportion of the yields of piracy."^[129][130]

Corsairs

Piracy may be called "an ancient if not always honorable activity," but various peoples widely practice it at different times and locations.^[131] A pirate (or privateer) may be distinguished from a pirate because the former operates under explicit government authority, while the latter carries no papers.^[132][133] The Mediterranean region during the late Middle Ages and Renaissance became the scene of wide-scale piracy (and privateering) practiced both by Christians (aimed more at Muslim shipping in the east) and by Muslims (more active out of the Barbary Coast in the west, with its many targets of Christian merchant ships).^[134]

The first "great age of the Barbary corsairs" occurred in the 16th century, between 1538 and 1571. Ottoman sea power in the Mediterranean was supreme during these decades following their naval victory at the Preveza. Ottoman supremacy, however, was effectively broken at Lepanto, although Ottoman sea power remained formidable.^[135] In the early 17th century, corsair activity again peaked. After that, Algiers began to rely more on 'tribute' from European nations in exchange for safe passage rather than attacking merchant ships one by one. Ottoman Empire's treaties with European states added a layer of conflicting diplomacy.[6] Lastly, during the wars following the French Revolution (1789–1815), Barbary corsairs activity briefly spiked before ending abruptly.^{[136][137][138]}

Barbary corsair leader Aruj taking a galley

In 16th-century Algiers, under the new Ottoman regime, the customs and practices of the pre-existing Barbary corsairs were transformed and made into impressive institutions. The activity became highly developed, with modes of recruitment, corps hierarchies, peer review, private and public financing, trades and materials support, coordinated operations, and resale and ransom markets. The policies developed in Algiers provided an exemplary model of Corsair business (often called the life reisi, or "board of captains"), a model later followed by Tunis and Tripoli and independently by Morocco.^[139][140]

Crews came from three sources: Christian renegades (including many famous or notorious captains), foreign Muslims (many Turkish), and a few native Maghrebis. Seldom did a native attain high rank, except Reis Hamida, a Kabyle Berber during the last years of the corsair age. The ship's owners selected captains from a list made by a few of the Riesi, an authoritative council composed of all active Corsair captains. Also regulated was the location of residence. "Captains, crews, and suppliers all lived in the western quarter of Algiers, along the harbor and docks."^[141][142]

Private capital generally supplied the funds for Corsair's activity. Investors bought shares in a particular Corsair business enterprise. Such investors came from all levels of society, e.g., merchants, officials, janissaries, shopkeepers, and artisans. The financing made money available for the capital and expenses of ship and crew, i.e., naval stores and supplies, timbers and canvas, and munitions.^[143]

"Because of the potential profits from Corsair prizes, the underwriting of expeditions was an attractive proposition. Shareholding was organized like that of a modern stock company, with the return to individuals dependent on their investment. This type of private investment peaked in the seventeenth century, the 'golden age.'"^[144]

Ransom of Christians held in Barbary (17th century)

After the pirate "golden age," the state of Algiers, mainly under the control of its Turkish janissaries, came to own many of the Corsair vessels and finance many of their expeditions. Strict rules governed the division of the prizes captured at sea. First came Algiers as the state representative of Allah; next came the port authorities, the customs brokers, and those who kept the sanctuaries; then came to that portion due to the ship owners and the captain and crew. The merchant cargo seized was sold "at auction or more commonly to European commercial representatives resident in Algiers, through whom it might even reach the port of its original destination."^[145]

Ransom or selling captured prisoners (and auction of cargo) was the main source of private wealth in Algiers. Payment for captives was financed and negotiated by religious societies.^[146] The conditions of the captivity varied, most being worked as slave labor.^[147] Often, the Muslim masters granted these Christians some religious privileges.^[148] During the early 17th century in Algiers, more than 20,000 Christian prisoners were held from more than a dozen countries.^[149] "To the people of Barbary captives were a source of greater profit that looted merchandise." In Tunis, corsair activity never became paramount as it long remained in Algiers.^[150][151]