The term "resolvability criterion" can refer to any voting system criterion that ensures a low possibility of tie votes.

  • In Nicolaus Tideman's version of the criterion, for every (possibly tied) winner in a result, there must exist a way for one added vote to make that winner unique.
  • Douglas R. Woodall's version requires that the proportion of profiles giving a tie approaches zero as the number of voters increases toward infinity.

Methods that satisfy both versions include approval voting, range voting, Borda count, instant-runoff voting, minimax Condorcet, plurality, Tideman's ranked pairs,[1] and Schulze.[2]

Methods that violate both versions include Copeland's method and the Slater rule.

References

  1. ↑ "Proof MAM is resolvable and reasonably deterministic". alumnus.caltech.edu. Retrieved 2018-07-21.
  2. ↑ Schulze, Markus (3 March 2017). "A New Monotonic, Clone-Independent, Reversal Symmetric, and Condorcet-Consistent Single-Winner Election Method" (PDF).
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