February Countercurrent
Part of the Cultural Revolution
Date11 February 1967 – 16 February 1967
(5 days)
Location
Caused by
  • January Storm
  • High ranking party members feeling threatened by the Cultural Revolution
Resulted inCultural Revolution Group victory, party elders criticized and are made to conduct self-criticism
Parties
Lead figures

The February Countercurrent (Chinese: 二月逆流; pinyin: Èryuè nìliú), also known as the February Adverse Current,[1] refers to the joint efforts by a group of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) veterans to oppose the radicalism at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution.[2]

Overview

The February Countercurrent occurred in February 1967, as senior generals and the Cultural Revolution Group became embroiled in a conflict over the direction of the country.[3]:154 The conflict pitted Communist revolutionary generals Tan Zhenlin (the vice Premier), Marshal Chen Yi, Li Xiannian, Yu Qiuli, and others against Maoist radicals[3]:154 led by Lin Biao, Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, and Zhang Chunqiao.

Li Fuchun hosted a meeting at his home with leaders who dealt with industry and transportation, including some CCP Politburo members.[3]:154 Li's focus was to discuss "grasping revolution and promoting production" despite the contentious political climate of the Cultural Revolution.[3]:154 The meeting turned to criticizing the Cultural Revolution and the damage it had caused to the social order and established leadership.[3]:154 Chen and Tan were the attendees who most vocally criticized the course of the Cultural Revolution.[3]:154 Eventually, a brawl broke out between members of the Cultural Revolution Group and the generals.[3]:154

An account detailed one of the confrontations, which involved the Marshal Ye Jianying slamming the table so hard, he broke several fingers. As one of the leaders of the Weberian-oriented People's Liberation Army (PLA) military commanders in the discussion panel, he accused the Cultural Revolution Small Group of undermining the military, specifically the incitement of radical insurgency against the troops.[4]

Response

Mao called a meeting on February 18 including Zhou Enlai, Ye Jianying, Ye Qun, Kang Sheng and others to express his support for Lin Biao and the radical Red Guards, saying "If someone opposes the Central Cultural Revolution Group I will resolutely oppose him," "The Central Central Cultural Revolution Group [...] errors amount to one, two, maybe three percent, while it's been correct up to ninety-seven percent", "If this Great Cultural Revolution fails, Comrade Lin Biao and I will withdraw from Beijing and go back to Well Ridge Mountain to fight a guerrilla war", and even taunted that Chen Yi's faction could take a try to bring Wang Ming, Zhang Guotao and even the United States and the Soviet Union to support them. Kang Sheng later said he had never seen the Chairman so angry.[5] Mao declared that the group was merely expressing its views and it was part of the intra-party life.[6] Mao required, however, that Tan Zhenlin, Chen Yi and Xu Xiangqian "request leaves of absence to carry out self-criticism."[3]:154 Because Yu Qiuli was not as senior as the other officials involved in the February Countercurrent, he was permitted to retain his position. He nonetheless became the target of Red Guards in Beijing who subjected him to many struggle sessions.[3]:154

The generals were denounced by Lin Biao as a "serious anti-party act".[7] Lin, who was designated as Mao's successor in April 1969,[2] denounced the countercurrent by describing them as those who "assumed the roles of backstage bosses and instigated the masses to fight the masses" and those who proposed that, in state organs, all cadres above the department director level should be "baked" or thrown out, paralyzing the numerous states organs in the process.[6] Chen Boda contended that the February Countercurrent was an attempt "to subvert the dictatorship of the proletariat."[3]:154

In March 1968, Lin Biao and the Gang of Four accused Yang Chengwu, Yu Lijian (second secretary of the Party Committee of the Air Force), and Fu Chongbi (commander of the Beijing garrison) of "overturning the case of the February Countercurrent."[8]:76–77 This event became known as the "Yang, Yu, Fu Incident."[8]:76 Based on allegations later deemed by the Party to be false, the Gang of Four and their allies contended that Yang, Yu, and Fu sought to had sought to seize power with respect to the air force and the Beijing garrison.[8]:76 Yang, Yu, and Fu were persecuted and some of their allies attacked and even killed.[8]:76

Reassessment

The post-Mao CCP reversed the judgment of the February Countercurrent, particularly following the downfall of the Gang of Four.[9] On November 25, 1978, Hua Guofeng announced at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Central Committee that the Politburo would openly and thoroughly redress a number of historic matters, including the February Countercurrent.[8]:54

In March 1979, the Central Committee issued a Notice of Open Rehabilitation and repudiated the allegations made by the Gang of Four during the "Yang, Yu, Fu Incident."[8]:76 The Central Committee resolved that the accusations were slanderous, officially restored the reputations of those targeted in the incident, and paid compensation for those who were injured or killed as a result.[8]:76

References

  1. "Resolution on CPC History".
  2. 1 2 Leung, Edwin Pak-Wah; Leung, Pak-Wah (2002). Political Leaders of Modern China: A Biographical Dictionary. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 241. ISBN 0313302162.
  3. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Hou, Li (2021). Building for Oil: Daqing and the Formation of the Chinese Socialist State. Harvard-Yenching Institute monograph series. Vol. 110. Cambridge, Massachussetts: Harvard University Asia Center. doi:10.1163/9781684170944. ISBN 978-0-674-26022-1. JSTOR j.ctv15vwhz6.
  4. Rene, Helena K. (2013). China's Sent-Down Generation: Public Administration and the Legacies of Mao's Rustication Program. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. ISBN 9781589019881.
  5. Gao, Wenqian; Rand, Peter; Sullivan, Lawrence R. (2007). Zhou Enlai: the last perfect revolutionary a biography. New York: PublicAffairs. p. 160. ISBN 978-1-58648-415-6. Retrieved 6 June 2023.
  6. 1 2 MacFarquhar, Roderick; Schoenhals, Michael (2009). Mao's Last Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. pp. 276. ISBN 9780674023321.
  7. "多维历史:陈丕显亲述二月逆流真相". Duowei News. August 8, 2013. Archived from the original on 2016-03-04. Retrieved 2014-11-06.
  8. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Guoyou, Wu; Xuemei, Ding (2020). Zheng, Qian (ed.). An Ideological History of the Communist Party of China. Vol. 3. Translated by Sun, Li; Bryant, Shelly. Montreal, Quebec: Royal Collins Publishing Group. ISBN 978-1-4878-0392-6.
  9. Denhardt, Janet Vinzant; Denhardt, Robert B. (2007). The New Public Service: Serving, Not Steering. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. p. 101. ISBN 978-0765605696.
This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.